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Do we need yet another report on India? A valid ques-
tion, given that there is no dearth of reports on India. 
Indeed, with the reports regularly produced by the pleth-
ora of committees and blue ribbon panels, multinational 
institutions, private financial institutions and think tanks, 
there is no shortage of analysis or recommendations. 
So, what makes this report different? First, while 
any number of reports on major issues bear on the 
future prospects of Indian society and economy, they 
are mostly vertical. They treat a topic in depth but on 
its own, with limited or no attempt to relate it to other 
equally important—and perhaps even more funda-
mental—related topics that have a bearing on possible 
solutions. This report tries to connect the dots between 
the key issues that in our view could decide the future 
of Indian society. Second, multigenerational issues have 
received rather short shrift in these reports and in the 
policy debate. This report takes a much longer 30-year 
perspective, with a corresponding emphasis on chal-
lenges that require long gestation to address. Third, the 
report offers a projection not of what will be but of what 
India’s potential is. 
The point of departure is a perspective on where 
India could be in 30 years and the “promise” that holds 
for its people. If India maintains anything close to recent 
economic growth rates—which Japan, South Korea and 
now China have done in their long growth spurts—it 
could be one of the top three global economic pow-
ers. More important, its people could achieve the living 
standards of an affluent society. 
This is not a preordained state of affairs. But it can 
happen, and that “can happen” comes with a long list 
of imperatives. The report also presents the alternative 
scenario of an India caught in the “middle income trap” if 
these imperatives are not fulfilled.
The report’s other distinguishing features:
It is put together by a highly experienced inter- •	
national team that has no institutional or policy 
agenda—private, multinational or civil. 
During its preparation, the authors consulted  •	
widely with policymakers, private sector execu-
tives and political leaders at the centre and in 
key states. 
It combines path-breaking analytical work on  •	
the lessons from other middle income countries 
—such as Argentina, Brazil, China, Japan, 
South Korea, Mexico and the Philippines—with 
the best work that already exists on India on 
many topics. 
It puts forth a framework that transcends the  •	
traditional ideological debates and gives equal 
priority to three overarching prerequisites for 
realizing the promise: maintaining social cohe-
sion; continuously enhancing economic com-
petitiveness; and achieving greater influence 
and shouldering more responsibility in global 
fora. 
The report focuses on issues that require long  •	
lead times and success in addressing them will 
critically determine whether India can deliver on 
its promise.
A final word on the recommendations and the 
tone of this report. In our recommendations we draw 
heavily on the experience of other countries. In doing 
so we were not oblivious to the fact that India’s size, 
diversity, political system, culture and history make it 
different. Each country has its own claim to uniqueness. 
Uniqueness, however, is not a justification for inertia. So 
each country, while learning from the successes and fail-
ures of others, has to devise solutions and take actions 
that fit its particular circumstances. 
The tone of our report is candid and forthright. At 
the risk of giving unintended offense we deliberately 
wanted to provoke discussion and hopefully concord-
ance among the major stakeholders on the complex set 
of multigenerational issues. This is particularly timely and 
urgent given the verdict of the electorate in the recent 
elections. An historic opportunity for bold and far sighted 
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action could be easily frittered away if the momentum is 
not seized. If the report serves to engage civil society, 
the press and the private sector in a vigorous ongo-
ing debate with the government—centre, state and 
local—on the need to act decisively on significant multi-
generational issues, it will have served its purpose.
Gautam S. Kaji
Chairman, Centennial Group
Chairman, Advisory Board, 
Emerging Markets Forum
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Introduction
India now has the second fastest growing large econ-
omy in the world, surpassed only by China. Its per capita 
income approached $1,000 in 2007, when the economy 
exceeded $1 trillion for the first time. While still home to 
the largest number of absolute poor and with average 
per capita incomes only a ninth of the global average, 
India has just been classified as a lower middle income 
country, a far cry from the 1970s, when it was still one 
of the world’s poorest countries. India today is home to 
many world-class corporations that enjoy global brand 
recognition and are busy expanding overseas as top 
global companies.
The economic successes are due primarily to India’s 
dynamic and competitive private sector and to the newly 
found can-do spirit of the newly confident middle class 
(and youth)—despite significant failures of government on 
many fronts. As an op-ed article in the January 2, 2009, 
New York Times put it, “Both the Chinese and the Indians 
are convinced that their prosperity will only increase in 
the 21st century. In China it will be induced by the state; 
in India’s case, it may well happen despite the state.”
India enjoys strong fundamentals, the basic 
ingredients for driving economic growth over a long 
period, potentially making India a rich country within a 
generation  —fulfilling Pandit Nehru’s dream of “India’s 
tryst with destiny.” The fundamentals:
In the next 30 years growth in Asia will likely  •	
dominate the world economy, and Asian econo-
mies will benefit from neighbourhood effects—
the fastest growing markets in the world (in East 
Asia) will be closer to home.
India’s domestic savings and investment rates  •	
have reached East Asian levels that, along with 
prudent macroeconomic policies, could drive 
productivity improvements and fuel rapid eco-
nomic growth.
The growth of manufacturing has finally started  •	
to pick up, broadening growth beyond its 
vaunted information technology sector.
India’s forthcoming “demographic dividend” and  •	
urbanization should fuel further growth.
The shift in values to those typical of the middle  •	
class in higher income countries that generally 
underpin the political economy of reform—
independent thinking, self-reliance, hard work, 
entrepreneurial spirit—appears to be now well 
under way in India. The rapid increase in the size 
of India’s emerging middle class would promote 
entrepreneurship and boost consumption.
But these strong fundamentals are hampered by 
some major handicaps—including infrastructure bot-
tlenecks, abject rural poverty, poor education and 
healthcare systems, an unstable regional neighbourhood 
and, above all, significant government failures, outdated 
bureaucracy and poor governance. The big unknown 
about future performance is whether India can address 
these handicaps fast enough to allow strong fundamen-
tals to drive economic and social progress over the longer 
term—or whether these handicaps will overwhelm the 
fundamentals and ultimately drive down the growth rates 
closer to the “Hindu rate of growth” seen until the 1970s.
The lessons of experience from some other middle 
income countries—such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
the Philippines—are sobering. They became mired in low 
or even negligible growth rates for extended periods after 
enjoying a period of high growth that enabled them to 
reach middle income status. In addition to addressing its 
own unique internal constraints, both real and perceived, 
India would also need to avoid this “middle income 
trap”—successfully avoided by many countries in East 
Asia and a handful of countries in Europe (Hong Kong, 
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Ireland and 
Spain)—for it to enjoy sustained economic success that 
otherwise appears tantalizingly within its grasp.
Indeed, there is a greater than even chance that 
India may get mired in the middle income trap unless 
there is a fundamental change in its mindset, unless gov-
ernance is improved dramatically and unless concrete 
actions, as opposed to mere grand pronouncements, 
are taken soon on the issues highlighted in the report.
Despite India’s recent success, the political and 
economic debate appears to be held hostage to the 













issues that the country struggled with in an environment 
of low growth and mass poverty. Propelled by the first 
generation of macroeconomic reforms launched around 
1990, which plucked the low hanging fruit, India has 
been able to jumpstart growth. But it is still reliant on 
the basic institutional structures, practices and mindsets 
inherited from the British Raj. Major policy and institu-
tional reforms seemingly are taken on only in times of cri-
sis and under duress, not as part of a long-term strategy 
that anticipates and promotes change. Those structures 
and mindsets—basically intact under successive govern-
ments comprising political parties of all economic and 
social philosophies—need to change rapidly for the 
economy to maintain high growth and to mature. Indeed, 
a paradigm shift is long overdue.
The time has come to ground the policy debate in 
a longer term vision of where the country could be one 
generation from today and to consider how to start 
transforming the country’s institutional, administrative 
and governance systems at all levels to meet the needs 
of a vast, dynamic, rapidly growing and young society 
that must wrestle with being rich and poor at the same 
time, sophisticated and yet backward, and a prospective 
global economic heavyweight but without political and 
military muscle.
To stimulate such debate, the report presents a 
longer term vision of India’s economy. It presents India’s 
promise as a “determined marathoner” that overcomes 
the challenges and sustains recent growth rates. The 
alternative scenario is that of a “sporadic sprinter” that 
periodically puts out a burst of reforming zeal when 
prodded by crisis. The payoff to the marathoner is huge: 
a per capita income of over $20,000 by 2039, four times 
what the sporadic sprinter can expect to achieve.
Rather than get bogged down in a spurious debate 
over the feasibility of specific numbers, the report 
focuses on what bold and ambitious strategy and 
actions will be required to achieve an outcome proximate 
to this vision. This approach brings into greater relief the 
major structural changes that the society and economy 
would have to undergo to sustain the past decade’s 
growth over the next three decades.
The report identifies the key prerequisites for stay-
ing on the marathoner route. It also points out new 
challenges that will arise from success. Much higher 
expectations of the public as citizens of a rich and 
democratic country. Massive appetites for natural 
resources (including energy). Huge disparities of 
incomes and living standards with its immediate neigh-
bours (making it a magnet for immigration for hundreds 
of millions). Much greater scrutiny from the international 
community as India’s global footprint expands. Finally, 
the report emphasizes fundamental changes in the basic 
mindset—to an unyielding fixation on implementation, 
results and accountability—which can only come about 
by transforming governance in all its facets.





















































India’s per capita GDP in 2007 was $940 (at market 
exchange rates). Based on this performance, the World 
Bank reclassified it from a low income country to a lower 
middle income country in 2008. In 2007, the least rich 
“advanced economy” on the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) list was Taiwan, with a GDP per capita of 
$16,768. Although the IMF uses other criteria as well as 
income to determine when an economy should be clas-
sified as “advanced,” income is a good proxy. our analy-
sis suggests that on this criterion, India could become 
an advanced economy by 2039. In other words, India 
has the potential to go from a relatively poor, developing 
country to an advanced (affluent) economy within 30 
years—a single generation. This is India’s “Promise.”
The Indian economy passed another milestone 
in 2007—$1 trillion in gross output. That made it the 
world’s 12th largest. If India becomes affluent, it might 
be the world’s second largest economy before 2039, 
second only to China and surpassing the United States. 
In other words, India has the potential to overtake the 
United States within a generation, even though it is only 
one-fourteenth the size of the U.S. economy today.
The central questions here: If India could fulfil its 
potential, what would such a trajectory look like? What 
would be the shape of a world with a dynamic India in its 
midst? Should policymakers take such a scenario seri-
ously? And what would it take to push India along such 
a path?
To answer these questions, this report uses a global 
model to provide a sense of the economic trajectory of 
different country groups. Like all long-run models, the 
purpose is illustrative, to foster debate rather than to pre-
dict the future. The purpose is to indicate the contours of 
the global economy over the next three decades.
Three basic conclusions
First, while the numbers and preconditions for India to 
become affluent in 30 years are plausible, the task is 
daunting. Very few countries have sustained growth at 
the required rate over such extended periods. India’s 
record of rapid growth is still fairly short, and its reforms 
so far have been fairly easy—reaping the benefits of 
plucking low hanging fruit. The next generation of 
reforms will be harder. Domestic institutions must be 
rebuilt to address infrastructure, higher education, urban 
management, technological development and innova-
tion, and the bureaucracy—and to lay the deep legal, 
social and political foundations for sustaining sound 
policymaking with a long-term horizon. The dilemma 
is that such reforms generate benefits only in the long 
term, making them hard for policymakers with short time 
horizons to set as priorities. Yet without them, policy 
measures to support sustained economic growth will 
become less and less effective.
Second, India’s fortunes will become—as recent 
events have vividly demonstrated—more closely 
linked to the world’s economic fortunes. For the past 
decade India benefited from faster global growth. 
Exports, foreign investments, nonresident Indians’ 
deposits and remittances—ingredients in India’s 
economic success—are linked to global growth. But 
as its global footprint expands, India will have to bear 
the responsibilities of preserving the global economic 
commons—whether for stability of the global financial 
system, climate change or free trade. It can no longer 
be a spectator in global economic management. Nor 
can it narrowly define its interests to include only short-
term economic costs and benefits. From a practical 
perspective India will need to develop a strategy for 
using its seat at the global table—whether the G-20, 
the UN Security Council, the BRIC forum, the post-
Kyoto negotiations, the UN General Assembly or other 
bodies—and to be perceived as a fair, inclusive and 
constructive leader in those fora.
Third, India is easier to visualize as an affluent, buoy-
ant economy if the other countries in South Asia are 
also developing and stable. But instability surrounds it 
today. Five of the seven countries that border it are on 
the Foreign Policy 2008 list of failed states—Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Preventing 
spillovers—of terrorism, immigrants seeking better liveli-
hood, refugees from climate disasters, water conflicts or 











































India’s record of rapid growth is 
still fairly short, and its reforms so 
far have been fairly easy. The next 
generation of reforms will be harder
regional political factionalism—will become even harder 
without greater stability and economic growth across 
the region. India, because of its prospects for rapid 
growth, stands to benefit the most from regional stabil-
ity and lose the most from instability. If current trends 
continue—with India growing much faster than the rest 
of South Asia—the disparities in per capita income with 
its neighbours could be a factor of between 7 and 14 
(similar to those between the United States and Central 
America and between Europe and North Africa). Such 
disparities would make India a magnet for immigration 
for up to 500 million South Asians, perhaps producing 
major social and political upheaval.
only India has the size and clout to lead regional 
cooperation and promote regionwide prosperity. This 
will not be easy because South Asia today is the least 
integrated of any region in the world and because dif-
ferences between India and its neighbours have deep 
and sometimes violent roots. But the European Union 
and North-East Asia have demonstrated the potential for 
expanding economic ties between erstwhile enemies. 
And if India is to become affluent, it will surely need to 
lead cooperative approaches to regional development.
Three assumptions
Three assumptions underpin the affluent scenario. 
First, the world is indeed in the midst of a historic 
restructuring—with the relative economic weight of 
developing countries in general and Asia in particular, 
set to become much larger—and this restructuring can 
continue to proceed peacefully. Second, the current 
financial turmoil, painful as it is, is being managed, and 
global growth will resume within the next one to two 
years. Third, the difficulties that many middle income 
economies have had in becoming advanced are due to 
deficiencies in their policies and strategies—and are not 
structural. The economic destiny of India lies largely in its 
own hands. In other words, it will be up to India to avoid 
the middle income trap (see page 9). If India were to fall 
into this trap, it would be only because of its own acts of 
commission and, equally important, omission.
Key results and findings
The global economy in 2009 may approach $62 trillion, 
measured at market exchange rates, dominated by the 
United States, with a $14.3 trillion economy, just under 
one-quarter of the global total. India became the world’s 
12th largest economy in 2007, with a GDP exceeding $1 
trillion, or 2 percent of the world, just surpassing South 
Korea. of course, South Korea has only 49 million peo-
ple, less than a twentieth of India’s 1.1 billion. India’s rela-
tively high ranking amongst global economies is a result 
of the huge size of its population and not its prosperity.
By 2039, 30 years from now, the global 
economy may be $200 trillion
Under our scenario, 2039 would have a world very differ-
ent from the one we see today. It would be significantly 
wealthier, with per capita incomes averaging $23,400 in 
2007 dollars, nearly three times the $8,500 today. The 
economic centre of gravity would shift to Asia, which 
today accounts for 21 percent of global activity, but 
by 2039 could account for more than half. Three giant 
economies, China, India and Japan, would lead Asia’s 
resurgence. But other large countries like Indonesia and 
Vietnam would also have significant economic mass. 
Malaysia and Thailand could have economies larger than 
Spain’s today.
The rise of Asia would not be unprecedented. 
Indeed, it would bring Asia’s economic share in line with 
its population share and restore the balance of global 
economic activity to that in the 18th and early 19th cen-
turies, before the Industrial Revolution led to the great 
divergence of incomes across countries.
The converse of Asia’s rise would be a fall in the 
share of the G-7 economies. Their global income share 
has fallen from an average of around 65 percent to new 
post-World War II lows of about 53 percent, and by 2039 
it could be just over 30 percent.
An economy 19 times today’s
India had consistent annual growth of 3.5 percent dur-
ing 1950–79, the “Hindu rate of growth”. In the ensuing 











































India could accelerate its real GDP 
growth over the next 30 years to around 
9.5 percent a year and go from poverty 
to affluence in one generation
two decades, annual growth increased to 5.5 percent. 
There is still considerable controversy about the role of 
economic reforms in this acceleration. Some argue that 
growth preceded reforms. others point to much higher 
growth rates in 1994–97, coinciding with the major post-
reform period. Regardless, it took most observers by 
surprise when India’s growth accelerated sharply to 8.5 
percent a year between 2003 and 2007. These episodes 
of “structural” changes in India’s growth suggest that the 
past is not prologue. Any estimation of growth potential 
based on historical growth rates would have missed two 
turning points, one in the early 1980s and one in 2003.
our model suggests that India could accelerate its 
real GDP growth over the next 30 years to around 9.5 
percent a year. At this rate the Indian economy would 
increase by a factor of 19, to reach $20 trillion in real 
terms.
Even that underestimates India’s global footprint. 
Because of real exchange rate appreciation, India’s 
actual economic size by 2039 could be more than $36 
trillion in 2007 dollars or a sixth of global output then, 
about the same proportion as its population.
In other words, India would no longer be a poor 
country with a small global economic footprint—it would 
become an average economy, with a large global foot-
print. And with the world rich on average by 2039, India 
too would be rich. Its per capita income in 2039 could 
exceed $22,000, adjusted for inflation and real exchange 
rate movements. In other words, India could go from 
poverty to affluence in one generation!
It helps to compare India’s projected growth with 
growth spurts in Taiwan, China, South Korea and Japan 
(figure 1):
Taiwan had a per capita GDP of $1,442 in 1965  •	
(the earliest point in our data sample). Thirty 
years later, in 1995, its GDP per capita was 
$17,500. The average annual growth rate over 
these 30 years was 8.7 percent.
China’s recent economic reforms, traced to  •	
1979, picked up momentum in 1993, the year 
after Deng Xiaoping’s “Tour through the South.” 
This is also the year when most prices were 
liberalized and the third plenum of the 14th Party 
Congress officially committed to move towards 
a “socialist market economy”. In 1993 China’s 
income per capita was $530, in 2008 around 
$2,720, with average annual growth at 11.5 
percent.
South Korea began its reforms in the early  •	
1960s. In 1965 its income level was around 
$700. By 1996, just before the Asian crisis, its 
income had risen to $16,230, thanks to average 
annual growth of 10.7 percent over 31 years.
Japan was a much more advanced economy  •	
than India in 1965. It already had a per capita 
income of $6,050, a level we do not expect 
India to reach until 2024. For the next 15 years, 
1965–80, Japan’s income grew at 9.2 percent, 
and in 1980 it reached $22,700, almost exactly 
the same as the income we believe India could 
reach in 2039.


































































India’s growth trajectory 
tracks Asian experience
Figure   
1
Note: To show the comparison with India, we start each country’s growth spurt in the year India 
would have the same starting income.











































India is following in China’s 
footsteps, 10 years later
Following in China’s footsteps
India has already started down the track of repeating 
other Asian growth experiences. Comparing India’s 
per capita income for 1991–2008 shows it has closely 
tracked China’s experience with a 10-year lag (figure 2). 
If that history repeats itself, and if India then goes on 
to track the experiences of Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan, it will realize the promise of becoming affluent 
within a generation.
To understand the effect of the shift of global eco-
nomic mass towards Asia, consider India-China trade, 
growing at more than 50 percent a year since 2002, 
to reach about $37 billion in 2007. While overall trade 
in both countries was growing rapidly, the growth of 
bilateral India-China trade was twice the average growth 
in total exports by either country. China is already India’s 
top trading partner. After adjusting for partner GDP, the 
propensity to trade between China and India is also 
higher than for any other major trading partners. There 
has also been a start of important acquisitions by Indian 
companies in China and vice-versa. As these business 
ties deepen, the underpinnings of future trade growth 
will become stronger.
In other words, India’s proximity to China, and by 
extension to the whole of East Asia, is a factor in its 
projected growth acceleration.
Faster manufacturing growth
Many reasons have been given for India’s faster manu-
facturing growth in recent years. Some emphasize 
reforms and an outward orientation. others point to low 
inflation, a depreciated rupee and low real interest rates. 
Doubtless all have played a role. What is important is 
that it is no longer necessary to question whether India 
can be unique in achieving rapid growth without passing 
through a phase of rapid manufacturing growth. The 
Indian model of service-led growth is giving way to a 
more traditional development model where industry and 
manufacturing drive growth and job creation.
Coming demographic dividend
India is set to reap a demographic dividend. Its labour 
force should grow by more than 1.7 percent a year over 
the next 30 years, with population growth at just over 
1.2 percent. So, the ratio of working-age population 
to total population is on the upswing. In addition, India 
still has a fairly low labour force participation rate of 61 
percent, partly because most women still do not work 
regularly. As the population becomes more urban, rich 
and educated and as more women join the labour force, 
participation rates are likely to rise.
Goldman Sachs, noting that 10 of the world’s fastest 
growing 30 urban areas are in India, forecasts that 500 
million people will be added to India’s cities by 2039. To 
see the impact of demographics and urbanization on 
labour force participation, look at China, which has a 
labour force participation rate of 82 percent and a labour 
force of more than 800 million, compared with India’s 
516 million. There is a possibility that higher labour force 
participation could add another full percentage point to 






















































India is following in China’s 
footsteps, 10 years later
Figure   
2











































The Indian model of service-led 
growth is giving way to a more traditional 
development model where industry and 
manufacturing drive growth and job creation
The demographic dividend takes many forms. It 
provides for a rapid reduction in poverty as the depend-
ency ratio shrinks. It gives families the means to save, 
accumulate and invest in their own well-being. Perhaps 
most important, it permits greater investment in children 
and human capital—the foundation for Indian growth for 
the next generation.
An emerging middle class
It is typical in development that the demographic divi-
dend coincides with the emergence of a middle class 
and a younger, more motivated population. Some recent 
studies have highlighted the boost to growth that comes 
from a large middle class. Political economy arguments 
suggest that a middle class base raises the importance 
of economic growth in policymaking. others emphasize 
the economic aspects of the middle class, providing the 
source of domestic demand, especially for consumer 
durables—cars, motorcycles, televisions, air conditioners, 
mobile phones and refrigerators. The middle class also 
demands housing, shopping malls and infrastructure, 
and can afford to take longer vacations, boosting 
services. And it saves for retirement, for housing and for 
children’s education, providing the resources for fixed 
capital formation, especially when there are two-income 
families. Because of these factors, most country exam-
ples of rapid sustained economic growth coincide with 
the development and expansion of the middle class.
India could witness a dramatic expansion of its mid-
dle class, from 10–20 percent of its population today to 
90 percent in 30 years. With a population of 1.6 billion 
forecast for 2039, India could add well over a billion 
people to its middle class by 2039 (figure 3).
others have also highlighted India’s burgeoning mid-
dle class. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, in 
a 2007 report, this middle class comprises government 
officials, college graduates, rich farmers, traders, busi-
ness people and professionals. These groups choose 
what they will consume, rather than be driven by the 
necessities of life. Such discretionary choices, reflecting 









































































































India’s middle class could expand by well over one billion by 2039
Figure   
3











































The immediate priority needs to be to 
protect India from the global recession, 
and that requires an aggressive fiscal 
stimulus and monetary easing.
Most analysts think about the middle class in terms 
of values as well as incomes. The World Values Survey 
provides some information on how Indian society is 
changing. It confirms that the values of the Indian 
society are decisively moving closer to those of the 
middle classes in developed countries: self reliance, 
independence, entrepreneurship, hard work, demand for 
quality public services and responsive government, and 
consumption.
A cautionary note
In the midst of the world’s worst economic crisis in per-
haps 70 years, it may appear odd to be discussing long-
term institutional issues that India may have to confront 
to grow rapidly in a sustained fashion. The immediate 
priority needs to be to protect India from the global reces-
sion, and that requires an aggressive fiscal stimulus and 
monetary easing, taking account of the deficit and debt 
situation. Most analysts are forecasting a slowdown in 
2008/09 to between 5–6 percent and then rising to per-
haps between 7–8 percent for 2009/2010. But the range 
of forecasts is high and depends on the timing and effec-
tiveness of implementation of expected macroeconomic 
policy adjustments, such as further interest rate cuts and 
a stronger fiscal stimulus package. India’s leading eco-
nomic indicators suggest that the current downturn could 
bottom out in the second half of 2009.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these short-
term forecasts is that few analysts are predicting a major 
slowdown to growth below 5–6 percent in 2009/10. 
That augurs well for the future. If indeed the deepest 
low-growth point is near 5 or 6 percent, the likelihood 
of attaining sustained, rapid, long-term growth of 9.5 
percent is boosted. our analysis suggests there is no 
a priori reason why India should not grow rapidly in 
the long term. It goes further and suggests that India’s 
potential growth can indeed accelerate further.
The current global crisis does highlight the critical 
importance of three fundamental global public goods: 
market confidence and economic stability, a well func-
tioning financial system, and an open trading regime. 
For India’s long-term growth it is in its self-interest to 
play an active role in ensuring that these three global 
public goods are indeed maintained, if not reinforced. Its 
credibility and influence in the global fora will require that 
its own internal policies in all these areas are consistent 
with its position in international discussions.
Cost of getting caught in the 
middle income trap
But we have also pointed out many examples where fast-
growing countries suddenly found themselves in growth 
doldrums, unable to move forward at the speed they were 
used to. These countries have seen income stagnate.
Consider Brazil, which grew at almost 6 percent for 
almost a century. In 1965 it was one of the wealthiest 
developing countries with a per capita income of $1,700 
(in 2007 dollars). It continued to grow until 1978, when 
it reached $5,500 per capita, with average growth of 
almost 9.5 percent a year. But then Brazil entered a long 
period of decline and stagnation. It did not regain its 
1978 per capita income until 1995 and then only briefly 
in the burst of activity that followed the end of hyperinfla-
tion and the beginning of stabilization. (Within four years, 
Brazil was again wracked by macroeconomic instability 
as it struggled to manage the aftermath of the East 
Asian crisis. It was only with the commodity boom in 
2006 that Brazil again surpassed its 1978 income. But, 
the current global economic crisis and resulting drop in 
commodity prices has again blunted, though hopefully 
temporarily, this recent resurgence.)
In other words, after a century of growth, Brazil 
spent nearly 30 years without further improvement in its 
average living standards (box 1). Although recent growth 
has been better, Brazil has still not demonstrated a track 
record of sustained fast growth that would allow it to 
converge rapidly with advanced economies.
Some East Asian countries, like South Korea, have 
managed three critical transitions to avoid the trap: from 
diversification to specialization in production, from physical 
accumulation of factors to productivity-led growth, and 
from centralized to decentralized economic management.











































For India’s long-term growth it is in its 
self-interest to maintain three global public 
goods: market confidence and economic 
stability, a well functioning financial 
system, and an open trading regime
Specialization allows middle income countries to 
reap economies of scale and offset the cost disadvan-
tages of higher wages. It also promotes rapid innovation 
and the introduction of new products and processes 
based on the capabilities of firms. The policy challenge 
is to understand how the public sector can facilitate this 
process, sometimes through managing geographically 
concentrated production. In Asia, there has been tre-
mendous specialization in electronics, for example.
An emphasis on total factor productivity growth 
requires major changes in education, from primary 
and secondary schooling to tertiary education. It also 
requires the right blend of competition and public sup-
port for promising new areas—in what has been called 
“discovery”. The knowledge economy has proven to be 
a source of major technological progress. Tertiary edu-
cation and the knowledge economy have progressed 
much faster in East Asia than in Latin America.
Modern economies tend to be complex, requiring 
speedy decisionmaking. Policymakers require large 
amounts of information. They also need to address local 
issues of opportunity and distribution. That is hard to do 
with a centralized system. Yet the challenge of decentral-
ization is enormous. Local governments, at least initially, 
can be more easily captured by special interests and 
have more limited capabilities than central administra-
tions. The decentralization of power can happen faster 
than the decentralization of effective institutions. Japan 
and South Korea both decentralized successfully.
The three transitions require leadership and the 
ability to sustain long-term changes. They also require 
high-quality interaction with the private sector. And they 
require a focus on results, outcomes and implementa-
tion effectiveness. That in turn means that the approach 
has to be pragmatic versus doctrinaire. These ingredi-
ents were present in each of the East Asian countries 
that successfully avoided the middle income trap.
Imagine that India were caught in the same mid-
dle income trap. It might reach the $5,500 per capita 
income that Brazil attained in 1978 by 2023, in 15 years. 
But if it then followed Brazil’s trajectory, it would still have 
a per capita income of around $5,500 in 2039 (instead 
of $22,000). Rather than a $36 trillion economy, it would 
have an $8.8 trillion economy.
The middle income trap refers to countries stagnating 
and not growing to advanced country levels. This is 
illustrated in the figure, which plots the income per capita 
of three middle income countries between 1975 and 
2005. In a steadily growing country, the line would be 
continuously rising over time (positive growth), that is 
towards higher income levels. That is the experience of 
South Korea. 
But many middle income countries do not follow 
this pattern. Instead, they have short periods of growth 
offset by periods of decline. Rather than steadily moving 
up over time, their GDP per capita simply moves up 
and down. That is the middle income trap—unable 
to compete with low income, low wage economies in 
manufacturing exports and unable to compete with 
advanced economies in high skill innovations.
What is the middle income trap, and how  
did some East Asian countries avoid it?





























Caught in the middle income trap
Avoiding the middle income trap
South Africa
South Korea
Up and down in the 
middle income trap
Figure   











































If India can develop along the 
affluent scenario indicated here, it can 
eliminate poverty within 15 years
Put another way, if India can develop along the 
affluent scenario indicated here, it can eliminate poverty 
within 15 years, under the World Bank $1 a day poverty 
figure of 456 million poor in 2005 or the Indian govern-
ment figure of 310 million. If India sustains rapid income 
growth at 8.5 percent, some 30 million people a year 
could be lifted out of poverty. Moreover, because so 
many of India’s poor still live with consumption below 
$2 a day—a number estimated by the World Bank at 
almost 850 million in 2005—sustained growth over the 
long term is essential to make a substantial dent in that 
broader concept of poverty.
A determined marathoner not a sporadic sprinter
The marathoner economies reap the rewards because 
they consistently and steadily pursue their objective over 
the long haul; the sporadic sprinter economies on the 
other hand are less dependable because they react to 
external stimuli rather than to internal drive. But once 
growth slows, it becomes hard to revive. Marathoners, 
by contrast, build the momentum to grow through the 
middle income trap.
India can be a growth marathoner, but it must under-
stand the world it is operating in and the changing shape 
of its economic footprint. It must start to put in place 
the institutions and policy frameworks consistent with a 
move from poverty to affluence in one generation. Few 
countries have achieved this, so the challenge is enor-
mous. But no country has achieved it without serious 
deliberations over the ingredients for sustained growth.
The main distinction between marathoners and sprint-
ers is the single-minded pursuit of their economic and 
social objectives spanning the terms of several govern-
ments. The marathoners did this by creating the institu-
tional capabilities to develop and periodically re-evaluate 
long-term strategies, set targets, monitor achievements 
and adjust policies and implementation as necessary. 
They never lost sight of what they wished to ultimately 
achieve by improving their governance and building their 
implementation capabilities to execute their strategies.




































































































































































2 Managing the transformation of any economy, especially 
a giant like India’s, is a daunting task. over the next 30 
years, India will almost certainly see an initial worsening 
of its income distribution, as parts of the economy benefit 
from integration with the global economy while other parts 
are left behind. It will also face pressures from other devel-
oping economies for a share of world exports. Its service 
exports have rapidly grown to global scale, but it has 
been much less successful in its manufacturing exports. 
Unlike China, Japan and South Korea in the past, India’s 
march to prosperity must take place in a different world. 
And its sheer size makes its evolution different from the 
path of other emerging economies except China (box 2).
Enormous challenge of managing three 
simultaneous transformations
If India is to be a growth marathoner, it must manage 
three simultaneous transformations. First is becoming a 
more cohesive society. This will require a sustained focus 
on tackling disparities and achieving inclusive growth. 
Within one generation India could be transformed from a 
poor and mainly rural society to an upper middle income 
and urban society, as its per capita income rises rapidly 
and millions of people move from villages to urban 
centres. Today a large number of people still depend on 
traditional agriculture—not integrated into the mainstream 
economy and not participating in the current economic 
boom. As a result, India has an enormous backlog of 
poverty manifested in hunger, lack of education, high 
infant and child mortality and limited access to water, 
sanitation, power and health services. As incomes rise, 
demands for quality services in each of these areas will 
also rise, perhaps faster than incomes, given India’s open 
democracy and the communications revolution.
So if India is to truly become affluent in the next 30 
years, it will have to solve the problems of rural society 
The forthcoming rise of India will make history in at least 
four aspects:
Size and speed. 1.   The Indian economy’s share of 
global GDP (at market exchange rates) would jump 
from about 2 percent in 2007 to almost 18 percent in 
2039. This compares with the hundred years it took 
Europe to its increase share of GDP to 20.5 percent 
before the Industrial Revolution to 1900, and the 
United States 93 years to go from about 1.8 percent 
of global GDP in 1820 to 18.9 percent in 1913. Japan 
went from 3.0 percent in 1950 to 8.6 percent in 1990.
A continental economy—and a diverse and  2. 
democratic society. There is validity to the argument 
that the challenges facing India cannot be compared 
with the experiences of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan or even South Korea. Europe’s rise occurred 
when it comprised a large number of individual and 
independent nations. Indeed, India can be compared 
with only two continental nations—China and the 
United States. And in the diversity of its people and 
democratic political system, only the United States is 
comparable.
No traditional levers of power. 3.   India cannot rely on 
military power or a particular ideology to expand 
its global footprint. Historically, western countries 
expanded their global economic and political 
footprints either through military might or by leading 
an ideology. They often secured access to cheap 
resources needed by their home economies through 
dominant military power or through political alliances. 
India must manage its expansion in the global 
marketplace without these traditional levers of power. 
It must play by the rules of the global economy and 
become more competitive than others.
A more competitive and global economy. 4.   The 
international economic environment facing India 
during the next 30 years will be much more 
competitive, and natural resources much more 
scarce, than even for Germany and Japan after World 
War II. Indeed, India will be striving to increase its 
share of the global economy not only in competition 
with other large emerging markets such as China but 
also as large western economies become much more 
concerned about their own jobs and prosperity.
Historic nature of India’s promising rise
Box   
2
























































































































































“If India is to be a growth marathoner, 
it must manage three simultaneous 
transformations: becoming a more 
cohesive society, becoming a globally 
competitive economy, and becoming 
a responsible global citizen
and deliver services to a massive population. This task 
will be made slightly easier by the fact that India’s popu-
lation will be on the move to cities. An unprecedented 
migration from rural to urban areas is under way. It will 
put tremendous premium on the speed and effective-
ness of local city governments in delivering adequate 
(and quality) services. Further, even as the per capita 
income of the country rises significantly and mass 
poverty is eradicated, disparities in incomes and access 
to public services and economic opportunities will need 
attention to maintain social cohesion. For this India must 
tackle much more aggressively problems of structural 
inequities.
Second is becoming a globally competitive 
economy. For India to continue converging with 
technologically more advanced economies, it must 
continue to enhance its competitiveness. Its current 
growth is mainly based on productivity gains from a 
shift in the labour force from low to higher productivity 
activities, as people move from farms to service firms. 
This strategy helped India move from a low income 
to a middle income economy. But it will not sustain 
the long-term growth that will permit India to become 
affluent. To do that requires support for a highly skilled 
workforce, innovation, technological upgrading and 
ultimately new technology development to continue the 
climb up the global technology ladder, as Japan and 
South Korea have done in the past 50 years. For this 
to happen, quality and merit-based education for the 
entire population will be a must. India’s infrastructure 
deficiencies are well known and must be resolved. 
Finally, as demonstrated by recent events, availability 
of a well functioning and stable financial sector is a 
key global and national public good, essential for the 
real economy to develop and prosper. The solutions 
in all these areas require making choices that have 
long-term consequences: rail or road transport, coastal 
or inland development, coal or renewable (including 
nuclear) energy and whether or not to develop Mumbai 
into a well-functioning modern city capable of hosting a 
global financial centre.
Third is becoming a responsible global citizen. 
India’s footprint in the global economy and resource 
base would expand dramatically, by a factor of nine, 
as its share of global economy jumps from 2 percent 
now to almost 18 percent by 2039. India’s sheer global 
size implies that it must take a different path to sustain 
development. Its use of water and energy is wasteful, 
and it seems clear that India must develop a competi-
tive economy that is much less resource intensive than 
today. The size of India’s economy also means it must 
concern itself with global economic citizenship—in the 
G-20, in the World Trade organization, in its relations 
with China and Japan, in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and in other global groupings.
To become a global economic and political power-
house India will also need to transform its position and 
relations within the subcontinent. Despite considerable 
progress in most other economic areas, South Asia 
remains dead last in regional cooperation. There is a limit 
on how far India and the other South Asian economies 
can go without cooperating as other world regions have 
done. For example, the countries share many regional 
public commons that cannot be effectively tackled 
in isolation—such as environmental degradation and 
climate change, water resource management, and secu-
rity and terrorism. Can India learn from China’s recent 
strategy to “extend” its growing economic prosperity to 
its neighbours and nurture closer relations with them 
despite past tensions?
For India to meet its promise for 2039, it will need 
to achieve social indicators and measures of economic 
competitiveness similar to those of South Korea today 
(table 1).
Imperatives for realizing the promise
Managing these three transformations simultaneously 
will be an enormous challenge. To do so, India must 
anticipate and adapt to the changes wrought by each of 
these transformations individually and collectively. Most 
of all, it will require a fundamental change in the focus 
and basic mindset of the policymakers to meet the:
























































































































































Managing three transformations 
simultaneously will be an enormous challenge. 
To do so, India must anticipate and adapt 
to the changes wrought by each of these 
transformations individually and collectively
Fast-evolving expectations of a younger, richer,  •	
more urban and more demanding Indian 
populace.
Needs of more visible and more critically exam- •	
ined changing Indian economy as it continues to 
climb up the global competitiveness ladder.
obligations arising from India’s expanding global  •	
footprint on its interactions and relationships 
with the rest of the world—and take advantage 
of related opportunities.
Until now, the Indian polity and economic policymak-
ing have paid primary attention to the needs of society 
(figure 4): how to reduce mass poverty and maintain 
social and political stability. Whenever there was a 
(real or perceived) tradeoff with the economy or India’s 
relations with the world—more often than not the policy 
choices were populist, deemed to favour the common 
person. The repeated inability or perhaps unwillingness 
of successive governments of all political configura-
tions to eliminate subsidies, open the economy faster 
or reform outdated labour laws are clear examples of 
these political compulsions and the populist policies to 
win electoral votes. While this may have been the right 
approach to decisionmaking when the country was still 
fighting mass poverty and trying to keep itself together, 
such a one-dimensional and doctrinaire mindset is no 
longer sufficient for India to become a much more pros-
perous society.
While societal considerations will obviously 






School enrolment, tertiary (% of relevant age group) 11.8 91
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and older) 61 na
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) 0.9 7.1
Physicians (per 1,000 people) 0.6 1.6
Urban population (% of total population) 29 81
Population in urban agglomerations > 1 million (% of total population) 12 51
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 33 na
Electrical outages (days) 67.00 0.04
Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output) 25.0 3.5
Mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people) 15 83
Broadband subscribers (per 100 people) 0.2 29.0
Clean energy consumption (% of total) 2.4 18.0
Carbon dioxide emissions (kilogrammes per 2005 PPP $ of GDP) 0.60 0.47
PM10, country level (air pollution: particulate matter, micrograms per cubic metre) 68 37
Water productivity (2000 $ GDP per cubic metre of total freshwater withdrawal) 1 31
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 0.9 3.2
Scientific and technical journal articles (per million people) 13 341
Researchers in research and development (per million people) 119 3,723
na is not available.
Source: Centennial Group in-house database, 2009.
Achieving Korea’s social and economic indicators
Table   
1
























































































































































The perspective and mindset for 
policymaking require profound change
democratic  —the economic and global considerations 
will steadily become more important, with all three 
becoming more intertwined as the Indian economy 
advances. As a result, India’s long-term prospects and 
growth will depend on its ability to balance all three 
dimensions as it makes policy decisions on almost 
every important issue.
Profound change in perspective and mindset
The perspective and mindset for policymaking require 
profound change:
Society •	 —moving from a poor society to a 
cohesive affluent society. In many countries, 
initial development brings with it greater equality 
as labour moves from low to high productivity 
occupations. But once middle income status is 
achieved, the drivers of development change 
and inequality can rise. India is in the throes of 
a major urbanization, but the shift will be too 
slow to bring the large rural population into the 
modern economy. Rural development and mass 
service delivery in both rural areas and cities will 
be crucial for achieving and maintaining social 
cohesion. As the country moves towards being 
affluent, it will need to change the focus of its 
social policy from alleviating poverty to main-
taining social cohesion. Removal of structural 
inequities will remain a challenge even after 
mass poverty has been eradicated. This change 
has to start soon.
Economy •	 —moving from a domestically oriented 
to a globally competitive economy. Despite 
rapid growth, India has not built a foundation 
for a modern advanced economy. Its enterprise 
sector is highly fragmented, and the share 
of medium and large firms is very small by 
international standards, crimping the creation 
of formal sector jobs and the adoption of new 
technologies. The country needs to accelerate 
development of broad-based manufacturing 
capabilities, now hampered by notoriously poor 
infrastructure and outdated labour laws. It also 
has to look east, towards the new growth cen-
tres of the world. And it has to broaden its skills 
base beyond a few centres of excellence and 
foster innovation on a national scale. In short, 
it needs to create and enhance its globally 
competitive edge. Finally, pressing ahead with 
and indeed speeding up reforms to enhance 
financial sector efficiency and stability along with 
restoring fiscal balance are still are of paramount 
importance. Hence the need to widen the 
focus of economic policies from achieving and 
maintaining high growth to enhancing global 
competitiveness and closing the gap with global 
best practices.
World—moving from a small player to a respon- •	
sible global citizen. India’s global economic 
footprint could jump by a factor of nine in a span 
of 30 years. Given the magnitude and speed of 
the expansion, it will be in India’s self-interest 
to improve relations with neighbours, to take 
responsibility for preserving a stable and well 
functioning global financial system and an 
open global trade and investment system, to 




Societal considerations have so far 
trumped the economic and the global
Figure   
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India’s long-term prospects and growth 
will depend on its ability to balance all three 
dimensions—society, economy and global 
citizenship—as it makes policy decisions
to accept appropriate global standards for 
efficiency and to care for the environment and 
minimize its carbon footprint. India’s mindset 
and the goal of foreign policy need to shift from 
protecting India’s narrow interests to becoming 
a trusted and respected co-leader of the global 
political and economic clubs.
The country—both government and business—has 
to strike a balance among all three dimensions if it is to 
stay on the marathoner route (figure 5). Effectiveness of 
institutions in shaping and implementing policies across 
the cross-cutting issues will be fundamental to becom-
ing a marathoner.
Central intergenerational issues
This report has deliberately focused on intergenerational 
issues that get short shrift in day-to-day political debates 
and policymaking under crisis. It identifies the following 
seven areas or issues that have a long gestation period 
but that require an immediate start in order to meet the 
challenges as the country moves from a poor society to 
an affluent society. Successfully tackling these issues 
will be critical to India’s ability to avoid the middle income 
trap (see part 4). Governance, accountability and imple-
mentation are overarching issues common to all:
Tackle disparities and achieve inclusive growth. 1. 
Dramatically improve the quality of the  2. 
environment.
Eliminate infrastructure bottlenecks—Create a  3. 
competitive edge.
Improve the delivery of public services—Create  4. 
functioning cities for sustaining growth.
Renew the focus on education, technological  5. 
development and innovation—Keys to sustaining 
improvements in competitiveness.
Launch a revolution in energy—Ensure security  6. 
and competitiveness.
Foster a prosperous South Asia and become a  7. 
responsible global citizen—India, its neighbour-
hood and the world.
In a desperately poor society, people traditionally 
look to their rulers for solutions to life’s hardships, the 
foundation of the “mai-bap” relationship between India’s 
government and its people. But an affluent and dynamic 
economy is based on a different approach to govern-
ance, one where government is not the decisionmaker 
and implementer of all economic decisions but only a 
facilitator and regulator to ensure competition, safety 
and environmental compliance. An affluent India (with 
its economy driven by private enterprise) will need a 
very different approach from its government—smart, 
focused on results and outcomes, pragmatic and willing 
to revisit laws, regulations, institutions and targets that 
have proven unrealistic, and inculcating a culture where 
politicians and bureaucrats see themselves as engaged 







Balancing society, economy 
and global citizenship
Figure   
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3 What is striking about the basic intergenerational issues 
is that their solutions are invariably rooted in one or more 
aspects of governance. Seven facets of governance 
must change to transform the Indian economy and 
society:
Create a smarter, more focused, agile and more  •	
credible government.
Retool the civil service to meet the needs of  •	
today and tomorrow.
Focus on the long term and open the public- •	
private dialogue.
Support competitive markets and prevent cap- •	
ture of state organs.
Inculcate a code of self-discipline and ethical  •	
behaviour within the business community.
Implement priorities, monitor results, ensure  •	
transparency and enforce accountability.
Reverse the deterioration in political  •	
governance..
Identifying practical solutions requires appreciation 
of all these facets that are closely intertwined like the 
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.
Consider a simple example. If delivery of quality 
basic education to all Indians is the stated national 
objective, one facet is making sure that the state and 
local governments actually give education the requisite 
priority and resources. Another is that mechanisms are 
in place to recruit enough fully qualified teachers—and 
post them to schools serving all segments of the society. 
Another is that teachers turn up at school every single 
day. And yet another is that someone monitors actual 
results and that individuals and units are held account-
able for addressing shortcomings and delivering results. 
All are part of governance.
Governance of the education system thus comprises 
clarifying the role of governments at all three levels—
centre, state and local—executing agreed policies by 
various parties, setting incentives for the behaviour of 
teachers (civil servants), focusing the system on the 
long-term implications of quality basic education and 
monitoring outcomes against agreed objectives.
India can certainly make do in the short term without 
fundamental changes. And the needed change—painful, 
contentious and certain to be resisted by the entrenched 
powers and vested interests—will require political cour-
age. It will be thus very tempting to leave such actions to 
successive governments.
There is, however, a very long gestation period for 
such fundamental changes in the system. It will take at 
least a decade, if not longer, before the requisite changes 
are fully realized. By that time India may be exactly in the 
trough where most countries get mired in the “middle 
income trap”. So, despite the hurdles and the temptation 
to put it off to another day, procrastination is just not a 
responsible option; in fact the lead times required to make 
the cultural and institutional transitions permit little leeway.
Actions on each of the facets could be regarded as 
immediate down payments and visible demonstrations 
of the Indian leadership’s commitment to build the foun-
dations of an affluent nation.
Create a smarter, more focused, agile 
and more credible government
Through the first generation of macroeconomic reforms 
launched around 1990, India has been able to jumpstart 
growth. But it still relies on the mindsets, institutional 
structures and practices inherited from the British Raj. 
While the values and attitudes of people and the private 
sector have changed dramatically since the 1990 
reforms, the government’s reach, structures, processes 
and centre-state-local relations have remained essen-
tially unchanged.
Today’s highly centralized government is over-
stretched and ineffective. The current model cannot 
be expected to work in one of the world’s biggest and 
most complex economies—1.1 billion people now (up 
from 350 million at Independence) and 26 states (about 
double the number in 1950), some larger than a majority 
of the world’s countries:
The government is still trying to do too much,  •	
well beyond its capacity and capability. 
As a result, almost everything done by the 
















































































A refocused government is essential 
to facilitating dramatic transformations 
in the Indian economy and society. There 
is a need to rethink not only what the 
government does but also how it does it
government is inadequate and inefficient, while 
many aspects critical for long-term success are 
being overlooked (such as the state of the edu-
cation system, the large-scale shift from rural 
to urban areas, the plight of cities, international 
economic diplomacy to enhance energy secu-
rity, threats from climate change and India’s role 
in global governance).
Central government still performs functions bet- •	
ter handled by state or local authorities, despite 
the federal structure anticipated in the constitu-
tion (central government programmes to provide 
basic education, improve urban management 
and provide power to rural areas).
The role of the Indian civil service—with highly  •	
intelligent generalists—in both policymaking and 
public service delivery was a major strength 
during colonial times and immediately after 
Independence. But the system has become 
outdated and a barrier to change (see also next 
section on retooling the civil service).
Until administrative fiat is significantly curtailed  •	
at the central, state and local levels, crony 
capitalism and petty corruption will continue to 
be a drag on the economy (the ongoing capture 
of regulatory organs and the access to public 
land and concessions by business houses and 
politicians).
The continuation of a combination of weak and  •	
ineffective state and more powerful and crea-
tive big business houses will inevitably lead to 
large-scale misuse of market power and invite a 
massive backlash against a market-based eco-
nomic system. While scaling back many current 
government activities, India urgently needs more 
self-regulation by industry as well as stronger 
and more vigilant independent state organs to 
ensure more ethical and transparent behaviour 
by the private sector.
A refocused government is thus essential to facilitat-
ing dramatic transformations in the Indian economy and 
society. There is a need to rethink not only what the 
government does but also how it does it. Refocusing 
and curtailing some of the current functions will make 
more room for performing the remaining government 
functions well. It will also release space and senior 
leadership time to focus more on the new functions 
and activities of modern governments (periodic assess-
ment and reformulation of broader economic strategy, 
stronger supervision of the markets—including financial 
markets—and an active and more coordinated role in 
various international fora).
India needs to fundamentally rethink and refocus the 
role of government at all three levels—centre, state and 
local—and create honest and well functioning institutions 
in all spheres of life. Tinkering at the margins will not do. 
Three interrelated changes are required:
Rethink the role of the public sector relative  •	
to a growing role for the private sector and 
civic society in all aspects of the economy and 
society.
Decentralize authority from the central govern- •	
ment to state, municipal and local (panchayat) 
levels. Consistent application of the principle 
of subsidiarity—tested and proven worldwide 
(European Union, United States) and enshrined 
in India’s constitution—is the only long-term 
solution.
Build high-quality and credible institutions  •	
accountable for delivering quality services 
across the public and private sectors and for 
overseeing private market players.
The primary role of government has to be to inspire, 
lead, coach and oversee the private sector and civil 
society, instead of being the primary decisionmaker and 
controller of the main economic and social activities. 
The shift will give greater space to the private sector to 
innovate, take risks and openly compete with others. At 
the same time, India must create room for strengthening 
government capacity for performing its basic functions 
and in addressing new areas critical for long-term 
success.
















































































Periodic functional reviews should 
identify areas for the government to withdraw 
from through downward decentralization, 
privatization, outsourcing or simple elimination
Another priority is simplifying administrative proce-
dures and reducing the number of agencies, at different 
levels, providing clearances for undertaking any activity. 
For example, at least 30 clearances involving several 
agencies at the centre and the states are required for 
setting up even a modest-sized industrial factory. Except 
in selected areas (such as provision of power and water), 
it is desirable to cut through the elaborate red tape and 
rely primarily on self-certification. The government can 
lay down standards and norms (say, for environmental 
impact or safety), and the entity concerned may be 
required to self-certify at the highest levels of manage-
ment that the notified procedures have been complied 
with. Government agencies can make random checks 
and if there are violations, appropriate penal action 
can be taken. Similarly, the complexity in regulations 
should be reduced drastically, as has been tried in some 
areas with success (for example, foreign exchange 
transactions).
Case studies of international experience in manag-
ing public services show that the objective of such 
programmes can be achieved better, and at less cost, 
if a distinction is made between the financing of these 
services (by the government) and the delivery of such 
services (by nongovernmental organizations and local 
enterprises). In such cases the public authorities retain 
the responsibility for regulating and monitoring the activi-
ties, providing subsidies where necessary and laying 
down distribution guidelines. In India two noteworthy 
examples of public-private collaboration in public serv-
ices are the public call offices, which revolutionalized the 
availability of telephone services all over the country in 
the 1990s, and the Sulabh Shauchalayas, which despite 
some problems are estimated to have provided sanita-
tion facilities to 10 million people at very low cost.
The functions of government thus carefully defined 
once should be periodically updated to eliminate those 
that are no longer needed or that are beyond its capa-
bilities. Periodic functional reviews should identify areas 
for the government to withdraw from through downward 
decentralization, privatization, outsourcing or simple 
elimination. Indeed, such periodic reviews and reas-
sessments, a critical function of a modern government, 
deserve much more attention in India.
Immediate steps
The required transformation in the role, focus and effec-
tiveness of the government—and at all three levels—is 
a huge undertaking and will take a decade or more to 
bring about. But that is no reason to delay. Instead, it 
demands an immediate start with strong support from 
top political and business leaders alike.
We propose two major first steps as a demonstra-
tion of the change in mindset and the resolve of national 
leaders to build the foundations of an affluent India within 
one generation (a closely related proposal on the retool-
ing of the civil service follows):
Refocus central government ministries •	 . To 
be credible, the move towards a smarter and 
more focused government has to be led by the 
central government reforming its own role and 
functions. A basic principle should be to fully 
separate strategy and policy functions from 
the execution of operational activities. Central 
ministries should focus on strategy, policy and 
monitoring, and delegate policy implementation 
to the states, independent public enterprises 
and the private sector. Enterprises retained 
under state ownership, currently under the pur-
view of sector ministries, should become fully 
autonomous, with an independent state organ 
exercising normal ownership rights (including 
oversight). This will eliminate the current con-
flicts and duplication in policymaking, create a 
more level playing field for all competitors (public 
or private), severely reduce the workload on 
the line ministries (allowing them to focus on 
their core functions and perform them much 
better) and permit a major consolidation of the 
ministries.
Give full autonomy, with clear accountability, to  •	
cities over 1 million in population within the next 
















































































An integral part of creating a 
smarter and a more credible government 
is a retooled bureaucracy
10 years. This can be done by implementing 
the intent of 74th Constitutional Amendment, 
which acknowledges cities as a “third sphere” 
of government. As Gujarat and Kerala have 
demonstrated, delegating full autonomy to 
cities and having fully empowered elected 
mayors is feasible under current Indian laws 
and can dramatically improve the quality of 
city management and public life. The three 
main obstacles—none of them legal—are: the 
reluctance of state authorities to cede power, 
the perceived risks of increased corruption and 
the low institutional capacity at local levels. To 
overcome the first obstacle, the central govern-
ment can deploy its considerable power of sua-
sion and use financial incentives by modifying 
the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission. 
The other two obstacles can be addressed by 
using public scorecards that measure service 
delivery, designing appropriate financial incen-
tives, building capacity and “professionalizing” 
local administrative services. Colombia turned 
its cities around—Bogota is widely regarded 
as a model—through a local financial account-
ability act.
Retool the civil service to meet the 
needs of today and tomorrow
Effective, professional and credible bureaucracies are 
a hallmark of all successful Asian economies and the 
United States. At Independence, they were also a major 
strength of the Indian state. An integral part of creating 
a smarter and a more credible government is a retooled 
bureaucracy aligned with the future needs of a large, 
complex economy, with the expectations of a more 
demanding affluent society and with the changing values 
and capacity of a dynamic private sector. Unfortunately, 
the Indian bureaucracy, despite its illustrious past, is far 
removed from meeting these criteria, and a major hurdle 
to implementing the government’s strategy and policies.
Numerous administrative reform commissions have 
recommended fundamental change—but there has 
been no follow-through. We do not need to go further 
than the recent report of the Second Administrative 
Reform Commission, which stated quite categorically: 
“It is ironical that there has been no sincere attempt 
to restructure the civil service although more than six 
hundred committees and commissions have looked into 
different aspects of public administration in the country”. 
The report went on to conclude: “Civil service has to 
change, not in the incrementalist manner that barely 
A strong, independent, efficient and credible judicial 
system as well as law enforcement machinery is critical 
to any nation’s well being. This is even more the case for 
India given its vast size and huge religious and cultural 
diversity. An aspiring affluent Indian nation needs (and its 
citizens will demand) these institutions to be functioning 
well.
The problems in the Indian judiciary, police and 
internal security apparatus are well known. The judicial 
system is plagued with vast under capacity resulting 
in huge backlogs of cases and very long delays in 
resolving cases as well as elements of corruption, 
especially at lower levels (but also in higher courts). 
At the same time, the judiciary is increasingly getting 
involved in certain aspects that are clearly in the 
domain of the executive branch of the government. 
The police apparatus also has its own problems: poor 
equipment, facilities and training; lack of full integrity 
and transparency in the recruitment at Thana levels; 
corruption; and poor accountability, to name a few. The 
November 2008 events in Mumbai have also highlighted 
the nation’s vulnerability to such attacks and exposed 
weaknesses in its internal security.
These deficiencies have persisted despite continuous 
pronouncements by successive governments. A crash 
programme is required to overcome them.
Judiciary, police and other internal security institutions
Box   
3
















































































The key to overhauling the civil service 
would be to inculcate the spirit of public service, 
re-create integrity and introduce accountability
touches the basic structure. It has to be a total change, 
a thorough transformation, a metamorphosis.”
Immediate steps 
Accountability to the people should become the guid-
ing principle of the civil service at all levels. This would 
require a major attitudinal shift among the civil servants, 
too few of whom see themselves as serving the people. 
It would also require a new structure for the civil service, 
consistent with the general thrust of decentralization. 
This should be the starting point for a retooled civil 
service.
The first major step would be to replace the current 
national Indian Administrative Service, comprising gen-
eralists, with officials specialized at state and functional 
level. The Indian Administrative Service as a national 
civil service should be replaced by general civil service 
recruitment unique to central and state levels of gov-
ernment. Selection should continue to be competitive 
and transparent. All professional employees should be 
recruited through the civil service at the relevant level of 
government, with competitive progression from one level 
to the next based on merit, not pre-ordained for an elite 
group of officers. Top managers should be allowed to 
select key members of their teams, based on merit and 
a transparent selection process.
The insularity of the senior civil service should be 
broken by recruiting senior professionals with an out-
standing record in business, science or academia for 
the top 15–30 percent of positions while encouraging 
promising young civil servants to obtain experience 
outside the government. The current system of perks, 
particularly housing, reinforces the image of civil serv-
ants as “rulers” and should be abolished, with its value 
monetized in the salaries. The key here would be to 
inculcate the spirit of public service, re-create integrity 
and introduce accountability. The new national service 
could be named the “Indian Public Service”.
Permanent civil services in Japan and the United 
States are structured along these lines, with some vari-
ance to reflect their political systems.
Another powerful instrument for improving the trans-
parency, responsiveness and credibility of all branches 
of government is strong support by the top political and 
civil service officials for the full and genuine implementa-
tion of the Right to Information Act. We discuss this 
aspect further later in this report.
Focus on the long term and open 
the public-private dialogue
A major distinguishing feature between the success of 
East Asian economies in raising incomes and the dif-
ficulties Brazil and Mexico have had in achieving middle 
income status—is a sustained long-term focus in all 
policy deliberations, to anticipate change, to constantly 
rethink strategy and to make timely strategic and institu-
tional changes.
This focus on the long term differs fundamentally 
from the traditional concept of central planning. It 
involves forging a shared long-term vision and goals for 
the country, and then using all available tools to achieve 
that vision. It requires motivating all economic agents, 
developing a concrete and realistic strategy that is 
periodically refreshed to reflect changed circumstances, 
forging strong partnership between public and private 
sectors, creating appropriate policies and incentives 
and constantly reinventing the related institutions. The 
basic challenge is to maintain a long-term focus within a 
country’s political and social setting.
Indian democracy precludes single-party domi-
nance, as in China, Malaysia and Singapore. India’s 
weakened bureaucracy precludes following the French 
(or Japanese) model. And given the recent era of coali-
tion governments and India’s size, it is not realistic to 
expect a single national leader to emulate Malaysia or 
Singapore.
In this respect, other distinguishing features in 
East Asia were the close interactions and partnerships 
between government and private sector. Their absence 
has been a negative factor in Latin America. Hong 
Kong, Japan, South Korea and the United States have 
forged a consensus among policymakers, academia and 
















































































India needs to learn from East Asia, 
recognizing the mistakes in earlier years 
and not allowing powerful business 
interests to capture the state
business on major economic policy and strategy issues 
as a result of regular interactions (formal and informal), 
mutual respect and recognition of joint interests.
In India having closer and more open interactions 
between the three, while equally important, will be a 
much bigger challenge. As in many former British colo-
nies the basic mindset is still mutual distrust. The Indian 
Administrative Service disdains the “impurity and vulgar-
ity” of the private sector and the “ivory tower” mentality 
of academia, so they really do not talk to each other. Yet 
in today’s world they must.
India needs to learn from East Asia, recognizing the 
mistakes in earlier years and not allowing powerful busi-
ness interests to capture the state (see the section on 
contestable markets). The private sector and public lead-
ers have to work hard to eliminate widespread suspicion 
and distrust of the business community among many 
intellectuals and the bureaucracy, a remnant from the 
British Raj.
The United States, while not a perfect match, comes 
closest to India in its diversity, its politics and its intel-
lectual capacity. Like the United States, India must find 
ways to maintain a long-term focus beyond the term of 
individual governments. In our view, in the absence of 
any obvious alternatives, India should look to the U.S. 
think tank model. Across several administrations of both 
parties, the Council for Foreign Relations has shaped 
foreign policymaking and long-term strategy formulation, 
the Rand Corporation defence policy, and the Centre 
for Strategic International Studies international security. 
While it will take much time and effort to replicate the 
United States model in India, we believe this is the best, 
if not the only practical, way to go.
The think tanks would also promote public-private 
sector dialogue by following the example of how the 
United States forges this consensus through the 
interchange between academia, business and the 
civil service, so that there is a constant flow of ideas 
and exchange of expertise and experience between 
the three. In the U.K. model, there is less of this, but 
certainly much more porosity than the current colonial 
models in the Commonwealth. So, building think tanks 
that bridge all three is the key to “selling” the national 
vision. Such think tanks will inevitably move towards dif-
ferent party affiliations due to different points of view.
India already has numerous think tanks. Under 
our proposal, however, there will be three major dif-
ferences: much less reliance on government funding 
and on government-sponsored projects; much greater 
specialization, combined with a critical mass of spe-
cialized professionals; and leadership by recognized 
professional experts in the field of specialization of the 
think tank.
Immediate steps
India should create a network of independent think 
tanks—independent of government, individual parties, 
advocacy groups and business houses—focusing on 
and specializing in longer term issues of great national 
interest. These think tanks should avoid becoming all-
purpose general research houses. Instead, they should 
each focus on one major critical issue and seek to 
become the very best source of ideas and national strat-
egies on that issue. The issues identified in this report 
could provide the starting point for the selection of the 
issues to be covered by the network of think tanks. In 
addition to domestic issues such as education, energy 
and cities, an early priority would be to facilitate work 
on two topics not yet on government’s core agenda. 
First is India’s role in the long-term political stability and 
economic prosperity of its immediate neighbourhood in 
South Asia. Second is India’s long-term relationship with 
the global economic community and the major multilat-
eral institutions.
The effectiveness of the think tanks will be highly 
dependent on their having a critical mass of dedicated 
and well qualified staff led by highly respected leaders 
with demonstrated track records and widespread cred-
ibility in their functional area. To ensure quality, inde-
pendence and professionalism, their core financing must 
be long term, preferably in endowments. Relations with 
the government in office should be at arms-length.














































































3 Support competitive markets and 
prevent capture of state organs
Effective competition policy combined with significant 
self-regulation is the hallmark of the United States and 
the successful Asian economies.
Corporate wealth in India has soared in the past two 
decades. By early 2008 India had almost 50 billionaires. 
The ratio of their net worth to GDP was over 20 percent, 
way above Latin American countries such as Brazil or 
Mexico, and even Russia. A handful of Indians reportedly 
own more than 80 percent of stock market capitaliza-
tion. While the expansion of corporate wealth was part 
of the pro-business policies that helped support growth, 
there is now a growing risk that parts of the corporate 
sector will wield excessive influence over the state. 
Indeed, some of the biggest fortunes have been earned 
in “rent-thick” activities that offer opportunities from privi-
leged access to land, natural resources and government 
contracts. This concentration of wealth and influence 
could be a hidden time bomb under India’s social fabric.
The emergence (or consolidation) of oligarchic 
capitalism can slow long-term development through 
its adverse impact on incentives for structural change 
and through the reduced autonomy of the state (box 4). 
Laying the institutional bases for competitive and effec-
tively regulated markets will thus be an essential ingredi-
ent of India’s long-term social cohesion and economic 
competitiveness.
Immediate steps 
The country must build open transparent markets to 
enable the easy exit and entry of the private sector in 
all aspects of the economy—including infrastructure—
to generate economic growth and serve the needs of 
society.
The public sector should give the highest priority 
to making the long dormant Competition Commission 
effective and credible. And it should focus on creating 
genuinely independent regulatory bodies to eliminate the 
ongoing “capture” of regulatory bodies by big business 
and politicians. Political leaders and policymakers should 
not only allow the regulators but also encourage them to 
use whatever authority they have to maximize competi-
tion and protect consumer interests.
Inculcate a code of self-discipline and ethical 
behaviour within the business community
While stronger, more effective and independent regula-
tory bodies are a must in a market economy, they can-
not and are not a substitute for market discipline. The 
business community must accept its responsibility for 
adopting and adhering to more ethical behaviour and 
self-discipline.
The dangers posed by the continuations over the 
longer term of today’s combination of weak state organs 
and a more powerful, assertive and at times unethical 
business community are enormous. Already, there are 
mounting concerns about the regulatory capture by big 
business and politicians (witness the failure of state elec-
tric regulatory commissions to carry out their fundamen-
tal responsibilities to protect consumer interests) and the 
state capture by large business houses on public policy 
(undue influence of policy, access to scarce land and 
mineral resources, award of large government contracts).
Recent events in developed countries have high-
lighted the enormous economic cost of privatizing profits 
and socializing losses. In many respects India’s chronic 
fiscal deficits are part of this syndrome. Populist policies 
designed to win votes over the short term not only use 
public funds for gains by individual political parties or 
leaders, but also give priority to consumption today over 
investment in the future.
The private sector must recognize that many current 
practices that allow a few powerful business houses to 
thrive are ultimately against the long-term interests of the 
business community as a whole. Not only is the current 
model not sustainable, it is potentially disastrous, as it 
could bring into disrepute the entire system and launch a 
popular backlash that will be difficult to contain.
Accordingly, the business community must take 
steps to inculcate a new sense of ethics, morality and 
self-discipline and to consider innovative business ideas 
“
Laying the institutional bases for 
competitive and effectively regulated 
markets will be an essential ingredient 
of India’s long-term social cohesion 
and economic competitiveness














































































3 that are profitable and that would help solve some of the 
intergenerational issues discussed here. In addition, it 
should support efforts by progressive political leaders to 
snap the country out of the current state of affairs as well 
as efforts by civic society and media to act as honest 
watchdogs of the system.
Immediate steps
The major business associations and chambers—
including the Bombay Chamber—should voluntarily 
promulgate a strong code of ethics and full disclosure, 
putting in place measures to ensure that their members 
adhere to it. The private sector should develop new 
“
India must build open transparent markets 
to enable the easy exit and entry of the 
private sector in all aspects of the economy
India’s corporate sector has been a major source of 
dynamism in the period of rapid growth. Many Indian 
firms now have global recognition and reach. This has led 
to a large-scale expansion in productive capacity—and 
also generated massive increases in wealth amongst 
India’s corporate billionaires. A common narrative is 
that India’s capitalism is in good shape, and it is only 
the creaking Indian state that is holding back long-term 
development and inclusion.
There is a large element of truth in this story. But 
there is a risk that India will evolve towards a condition 
of oligarchic capitalism, in which the market and political 
power of major corporations will become a drag on long-
term growth and a source of distortion in policy design. 
India is vulnerable precisely because parts of the state 
are weak and so susceptible to influence, whether via 
political finance, the political need to get investment or 
outright corruption.
India’s development dynamic is not unusual. Many 
countries have experienced periods of rapid growth 
thanks to family-based corporations and then had to deal 
(or failed to deal) with the risk of oligarchic capitalism. 
U.S. dynamism in the late 19th century involved highly 
successful investors such as J.D. Rockefeller—known 
as “robber barons” by some—who formed immense 
conglomerates or “trusts”. Japan and South Korea also 
relied on family-based conglomerates. But all these 
countries then developed policies and institutions to 
check their power. Mexico’s recent history provides a 
warning. The development of corporations, controlled 
by wealthy business families, has in many sectors led to 
high-cost structures that are hurting growth prospects—
and this despite an external opening that is deeper 
and broader than India’s. In Mexico’s case the problem 
is closely linked to the weakness of the judicial and 
regulatory system, and a poorly informed legislature. The 
consolidation of oligarchic capitalism would lead India 
into the middle income trap.
Fostering competitive rather than oligarchic 
capitalism is a major issue of institutional design for 
India. This does not mean a return to a controlling state, 
but it does require a more effective and autonomous 
state in many areas. Specific domains for action include 
the effective implementation of the long-delayed new 
competition law assuring transparent and competitive 
mechanisms for award of concessions and independent 
regulation of public private partnership in infrastructure 
and getting greater transparency and openness into land 
allocation processes.
These will involve tackling the broader problem of 
links of power and money between politicians, the state 
and the private sector. The Right to Information Act 
and social watchdogs will be a necessary complement 
to accountability mechanisms within the state. Also 
central to competitive capitalism over the long run is the 
continued broadening of the financial system and the big 
issue of an effective judiciary. Policy design is not a once-
off affair, but an ongoing challenge, as illustrated by the 
more recent experience of the United States, from Enron 
to the subprime crisis.
Equally important is the behaviour of the business 
sector itself: there is scope for establishing codes of 
conduct over independent directors and procurement 
behaviour. Established firms can work the system. But 
the business sector as a whole—especially actual and 
potential new entrants—has an interest in pressing for 
stronger checks and balances, working with the state 
and societal groups. Whether the business sector can 
organize itself to support such changes is one of the big 
questions India now faces.
Oligarchic or competitive capitalism?
Box   
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India has already adopted the appropriate 
policies and laudable—publicly announced—
targets. But the country almost uniformly 
falls short in delivering on its intentions
business models that facilitate inclusive growth and 
are good long-term business propositions: models for 
affordable housing, higher environmental standards and 
green projects, and low-cost delivery of quality health 
and education services.
Two important groups must accept and carry 
out special responsibilities. The professional service 
entities—for example, the chartered accountants, audi-
tors, corporate lawyers and credit rating agencies—must 
accept their special role and responsibilities in ensuring 
that their reports and activities are indeed independent, 
meet the highest ethical standards and fully adhere to 
the standards set by their professional bodies. This is 
essential to avoid repetition of episodes like Satyam 
and Enron. Second, independent directors of listed 
companies must recognize and perform the special role 
expected of them in corporate governance in market-
based economies. The relevant professional bodies 
must impose severe and public penalties, without 
exception, on members who violate their standards.
In other words, all key players in the markets must 
fully recognize their respective roles and responsibilities 
and undergo a fundamental change in the mindset, just 
as we recommend for policymakers and the civil service.
Implement priorities, monitor results, ensure 
transparency and enforce accountability
Another distinguishing feature of successful East Asia 
countries and China—and perhaps their biggest differ-
ence with India today—has been their single-minded 
focus on results. Consistent with this basic mindset, 
these countries set and agreed on specific and time-
bound outcome targets, put great emphasis on monitor-
ing results in real time and enforced accountability.
It is widely accepted that the biggest difference 
between China and India is China’s far superior (politi-
cal and administrative) ability to produce results on the 
ground, by effectively implementing agreed policies and 
programmes. A major reason for the difference is imple-
mentation and structural coherence in China because of 
the single party system. But that coherence comes from 
a consistent vision, a pragmatic approach to implemen-
tation and clear accountability.
The fundamental governance problem everywhere 
is how to align the vision (which the layman associates 
with globally sophisticated elite) with ground-level local 
politics. In this sense, how Meiji was able to forge a con-
sensus among not just the intellectuals, but broad-based 
Japan is a telling lesson. Deng’s Southern Sojourn had 
a historical precedent in the 18th century, when Kangxi 
made the same journey to signal the commitment to 
reform.
our review of India’s policy framework—be it in 
education, rural electrification, power generation, admin-
istrative reforms, or subsidies—reveals that, overall, the 
country has already adopted the appropriate policies and 
laudable—publicly announced—targets. But the country 
almost uniformly falls short in delivering on its intentions. 
This is partly due to the government’s overstretched 
reach and the lack of institutional capacity to deliver on 
most promises. But the underlying problem is that the 
basic mindset of the leadership does not put a premium 
on results, or on holding people accountable for imple-
menting agreed policies and programmes (box 5).
The power sector is a prime example. At the 
centre, the Ministry of Power and enterprises under it 
have repeatedly failed to meet accepted targets amply 
funded by the government. The state governments have 
routinely failed to cut power subsidies or make state 
electricity boards genuinely viable despite repeated 
agreements at many national summits. State-owned dis-
tribution companies routinely fail to reduce distribution 
losses required under various centrally funded schemes. 
Even though successive governments have assigned the 
highest priority to resolving the power shortages, reduc-
ing subsidies and connecting all rural areas, the short-
ages continue to mount, subsidies continue unabated 
and millions of rural users remain without grid-supplied 
power. Yet, no state has been deprived of funds, no 
fundamental changes have been made by the power 
ministry, and no senior officials or political leaders are 
known to have been held accountable.
















































































India must set measurable outcome 
targets, monitor actual results and 
enforce clear accountabilities
Within this pernicious environment there are prom-
ising examples, albeit too few, showing that the “sys-
tem” is still capable of responding quickly to changes 
in the mindset and priorities of the top leadership. 
Consider improvements in the overall quality of life, 
air quality and road transport in Delhi. Also look at the 
metro system in Delhi, the utilities and urban manage-
ment in Gujarat and the recent strides made in primary 
education in Bihar, a state often dismissed in the past 
as “ungovernable”.
Immediate steps
What is necessary is a massive nationwide replication 
and scaling up of these isolated successes. And that 
calls for a basic change in the mindset of the entire politi-
cal and administrative as well as business leadership. 
The country must set measurable outcome targets, 
monitor actual results and enforce clear accountabilities. 
Again, the starting point has to be at the central govern-
ment level (until the decentralization and refocusing of 
government recommended above is fully in place).
The functioning of the Indian state lies at the centre of 
current concerns about political, social and economic 
outcomes. Its future performance will have a determining 
influence on whether India succeeds in the long transition 
to higher income or gets stalled in a middle income trap.
Currently the state displays a perplexing mix of 
characteristics. There is a tradition based on the principle 
of an autonomous, even Weberian, bureaucracy, 
epitomized by national services, such as the Indian 
Administrative Service. But many parts of the state are 
stuck in a low-level equilibrium—with dismal service 
quality, low levels of effort, widespread corruption and 
extensive politicization. All this is clearly problematic for 
the complex and responsive functions the state needs 
to carry out—now and increasingly more so in the long 
transition. But there are also problems with the many 
parts of the state where the Indian Administrative Service 
is dominant; for all their collective talent, the service has 
become a force for inertia, for resisting change in favour 
of just keeping the existing system and privileges.
The poor performance of the state is vividly manifest 
in a wide range of functions, from teaching to the 
judiciary. But the larger problem is that the state does not 
appear to be on a path of transformation to being more 
responsive and effective. And this is in large part because 
a weak state can facilitate political and economic 
decisions through corruption or political influence (as 
opposed to the highly desirable political influence that 
flows from an effective democratic process).
How can change occur? The challenge is to 
make the government genuinely accountable—to 
citizens, business and politicians—but through 
transparent processes. Such accountability works 
best when external societal pressures complement 
internal accountability structures within the state to 
provide incentives for responsiveness and checks and 
balances against corruption, discrimination or abuse. 
Among the catalysts for change, the most promising 
developments in India today probably flow from 
external, societal pressures, facilitated by important 
state-created processes. Examples include the Right 
to Information Act and the social audits as a legal 
requirement for government programmes. Potentially 
of equal importance would be pressure from business 
associations for a better state—working as a collective 
force, rather than seeking individual favour.
Also of great potential influence is the deepening of 
local democracy, with evidence of change in rural areas 
through the Panchayati Raj system. But a major gap in 
the existing structure of formal democratic accountability 
is the weakness of local democracy in urban areas, which 
will be the primary motor of change.
The transformation of the state is of fundamental 
importance for any transition to prosperity: there 
are no silver bullets, but change can occur through 
societal (and business) pressure and the deepening of 
democracy, complemented by internal administrative 
reforms.
Accountable government
Box   
5
















































































The Indian electorate in the recent 
elections has unequivocally demanded a 
government that can function and deliver
Specifically, we propose that a high-level monitor-
ing unit be created in the office of the Prime Minister. It 
should have an unambiguous mandate to agree with 
the responsible parties and consolidate a timetable for 
policy implementation and for the outcome targets for all 
major government programmes, initiatives and projects. 
It would report quarterly and publicly on the progress 
relative to the agreed outcomes. It would identify issues 
needing cabinet attention and propose remedial actions. 
And it would pinpoint responsibility and accountability 
for success and for any major shortfalls.
In China similar functions are carried out by the 
State Council, with analysis by the State Economic 
Reforms Commission. In the United States, the office of 
Management and Budget in the White House and the 
Government Accountability office in the Congress have 
similar responsibilities. In both countries a critical success 
factor is their direct access and reporting to the head of 
national government as well as a strong professional staff 
(that transcends the term of the government in power).
The proposed monitoring unit should be in the Prime 
Minister’s office, professionally led by a person of stature 
with no stake in a career in the general civil service and 
have a permanent statutory role (to transcend terms 
of individual governments and to give it the necessary 
clout over the bureaucracy). Similar monitoring capacity 
should be tried for state and local governments.
A related area is transparency in decisionmaking 
within the government. A major step in this respect has 
been the enactment of the Right to Information Act in 
2005. The beneficial impact of this legislation in making 
government accountable and citizen-friendly is already 
visible. A further step in this direction is to require all min-
istries and departments of the government to proactively 
make information on their decisions available to the pub-
lic (excluding security-related subjects). The information 
should be released by the ministries without the need 
for any member of the public to ask for it. If this is done, 
the free media and civil society institutions will be better 
placed to promote accountability in the decisionmaking 
process.
Reverse the deterioration in 
political governance
There is almost universal agreement amongst every-
one we consulted that almost all problems concerning 
the above facets of governance and their solutions 
are rooted in India’s political governance. There also 
appears a strong consensus that India’s democracy 
and political governance—a major strength and rea-
son for India’s survival during the period immediately 
after Independence—has deteriorated alarmingly dur-
ing the past two decades, making it extremely difficult 
to govern the country, irrespective of which party is in 
power.
our team was initially reluctant to comment on 
this central issue, since solutions can be devised only 
through an open and candid debate and agreement 
between the leaders of major political parties and 
experts much more knowledgeable than we are.
However, the Indian electorate in the recent elec-
tions has probably shown a greater recognition of 
the issue than the political power brokers and has 
unequivocally demanded a government that can func-
tion and deliver without having to drop to the lowest 
common denominator in order to mollycoddle its coali-
tion partners who share neither a national aspiration nor 
perspective.
This clarion call of the voters in May 2009, in our 
view, presents a historic opportunity for bold and 
decisive action. While clearly the government needs to 
develop a strategy and a plan of action first to generate 
a consensus around end outcomes and then the means, 
the momentum provided by the recent verdict of the 
electorate should not be allowed to dissipate.
The smaller regional parties have a vital role in their 
states, where they often form the state governments. 
Even with an effective national government at the 
centre, state leadership has to grasp control and act in 
a number of the areas mentioned in this report. A con-
fident and committed central government that provides 
leadership and facilitates the states’ ability to act would 
clearly accelerate the process.
















































































Even with an effective national 
government at the centre, state leadership 
has to grasp control and act
Immediate steps 
Soon after the elections in April–May 2009 the govern-
ment should lay out, say in the next 30 days, clear 
targets for where the country should be on some 5–6 (if 
not all) of the intergenerational issues. These should be 
debated, over the next 60 or so days, in a public-private 
dialogue that engages the political sphere, civil society 
and the private sector. Based on the outcome of these 
discussions, the government should then refine these 
targets, establish clear yardsticks and milestones and 
spell out the accountability and the “how” of achieving 
them. These should then go through the formal federal 
and state legislative approval processes. The high-level 
unit recommended to be set up in the Prime Minister’s 
office (see earlier section) should be charged with moni-
toring and periodically reporting on progress.
Such an agenda should be supplemented by 
measures to enable and empower state and local 
governments to carry greater responsibility and 
accountability for meeting day-to-day needs of the 
public, including most essential public services (basic 
education, health, water, sanitation, power and public 
safety).
These suggestions for reforming political governance 
are by no means exhaustive. But if implemented, they 
would set the stage for India to seize the opportuni-
ties that lie ahead and make it one of the strongest 
economies in the world by 2039. Widespread poverty, 
illiteracy and disease would also be correspondingly 
reduced. The universally lauded democratic system of 
government would then have given all Indians their just 
rewards.




































































































4 This part of the report has focused deliberately on 
intergenerational issues that get short shrift in day-to-
day political debates and in policymaking under crisis. It 
identifies seven areas or issues that have a long gesta-
tion period but that require an immediate start in order to 
meet the challenges as India moves from a poor society 
to an affluent society. Successfully tackling these issues 
will be critical to the country’s ability to avoid the middle 
income trap. Governance, accountability and implemen-
tation are overarching issues common to all.
Tackle disparities and achieve inclusive growth. 1. 
Dramatically improve the quality of the  2. 
environment.
Eliminate infrastructure bottlenecks—Create a  3. 
competitive edge.
Improve the delivery of public services—Create  4. 
functioning cities for sustaining growth.
Renew the focus on education, technological  5. 
development and innovation—Keys to sustaining 
improvements in competitiveness.
Launch a revolution in energy—Ensure security  6. 
and competitiveness.
Foster a prosperous South Asia and become a  7. 
responsible global citizen—India, its neighbour-
hood and the world.
While our report is focused on these seven inter-
generational issues, we would like to highlight the impor-
tance of reforms in a number of other areas that are also 
essential for India to sustain high economic growth rates. 
First and foremost we assume that the country will con-
tinue to maintain sound monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policies in a manner necessary to have macroeco-
nomic balances. Second, India will need to accelerate 
reforms in its trade policy to open the economy much 
more and subject domestic producers to greater global 
competition. Third, far reaching reforms in the financial 
sector and in labour markets are absolutely essential. 
These areas as well as the need to make funda  mental 
improvements in the basic education system are already 
on the country’s policy agenda. In addition, in each 
of these areas many high-quality reports have been 
prepared in the last few years. We did not feel that this 
work needed to be duplicated. We would, however, like 
to underline the urgency of implementing in practice the 
related proposals that have in most cases already been 
accepted and adopted as official policy.
Intergenerational issue 1. Tackle 
disparities and achieve inclusive growth
Inclusive growth has become a leitmotif of the policy dis-
course in the past few years—not only in India but also in 
other developing countries. The shift to inclusive growth 
marks a broadening of concerns about inequality. The 
focus has been on how the excluded groups can partici-
pate in aggregate growth—that is, how can government 
policy, directly and indirectly, bring the benefits of growth 
to all. This takes policy discussions to the domains of 
education, health, basic infrastructure, agricultural pro-
ductivity, basic urban services and so on.
Tackling disparities and achieving inclusive growth—
and the policies aimed to do so—remain of great impor-
tance for India’s longer term development prospects. 
The big issues lie less in design than in implementation, 
in the context of a governmental apparatus that suffers 
from severe distortions and inefficiencies, with typically 
dismal service provision, especially for middle and poor 
groups, and associated corruption and patronage.
In our view the imperatives for tackling disparities 
and achieving inclusive growth in India go further. 
Structural inequalities are not only deep and persistent, 
they are also intimately linked with institutional structures 
in the political, social and economic domains—and they 
are likely to impede the transformations necessary for 
long-term growth. Institutional and policy change to 
effect genuine social cohesion is necessary if India is to 
avoid the “middle income trap” and reach the status of 
an affluent society.
What inequalities matter most for 
India’s development process?
The most common yardsticks of inequality are based on 
differences in income or expenditure across individuals. 






















































































In the long term, entrenched 
inequalities are likely to take India down 
a sure path to the middle income trap
4 The Gini coefficient is a common synthetic index. By this 
type of measure, India is fairly equal, much more so than 
almost all Latin American countries. But this is mislead-
ing, both because India’s household surveys almost 
certainly underestimate inequalities and because this 
measure does not capture the differences most salient 
for economic, political and social dynamics. More impor-
tant are structural inequalities associated with corporate 
wealth, groups, geography and education.
Corporate wealth  •	 has soared in the past two 
decades (figure 6). By early 2008 India had 
almost 50 billionaires. The ratio of their net 
worth to GDP was over 20 percent, way above 
comparable ratios in Brazil or Mexico. Their net 
worth has dropped a lot with the financial crisis, 
but more important is the long-run shift. While 
the expansion of corporate wealth accompanied 
the pro-business policies that helped support 
growth, there is now a growing risk that parts 
of the corporate sector will wield excessive 
influence over different parts of the state. The 
emergence (or consolidation) of oligarchic capi-
talism can slow long-run development through 
its adverse impact on incentives for structural 
change and through the reduced autonomy of 
the state.
Group-based inequalities •	 , associated with 
caste, gender and tribal status, have always 
been profound in India, affecting opportunities, 
incomes, education, health status and dignity. 
Differences across religions are also of great 
social and political relevance. Despite major 
expansions in services and affirmative action 
for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, 
those differences have not narrowed—indeed, 
they have widened for Hindu scheduled tribes, 
many of which suffer further from being caught 
in the conflict between Naxalites and the state 
(table 2). There has been rising politicization 
of socio  cultural differences, in response to 
government group-based policies, political 
mobilization and the long-standing tensions on 
religious grounds. Group-based distributional 
conflicts, if unresolved, can divert government 
policy from broad-based development and 
genuine equity, and in the extreme lead to open 
violence.
Spatial differences •	  have risen sharply in the 
past 20 years, across different states and 
between rural and urban areas. The ratio of 
per capita product between Gujarat and Bihar 
went from about two times in the late 1980s to 
almost four times the mid-2000s. Such spatial 
inequalities rose as some regions took off faster 
than others, in part because of the removal of 
the spatially equalizing industrial policies of the 
licensing system. But powerful influences from 
economies of agglomeration and institutional 
































The reported net worth of India’s 
billionaires relative to India’s 
GDP rose spectacularly
Figure   
6
Note: This includes only Indians resident in India. It is also a ratio of a stock (net worth) to a flow 
(GDP), since there are no direct measures of India’s total net worth. However, intertemporal and 
intercountry comparisons still carry information value; they would be strictly comparable only if 
national ratios of capital to income were constant.
Source: Forbes.com and World Development Indicators.






















































































persist. This is particularly problematic in India 
because lagging regions include such populous 
and politically important northern states as Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh.
Education and skill-based differences •	 . 
Engineering and graduate skills have been 
important sources of the growth acceleration in 
areas ranging from automobiles to information 
technology. But with the initial stock of such 
skills largely absorbed, salaries of the highly 
skilled started rising very fast in the 2000s. 
The supply of skilled workers has so far not 
increased—and it can take a generation or 
longer to change the structure of the labour 
force. Both basic and tertiary education suffer 
from serious problems of low quality, lack of 
accountability and disempowered teachers. 
Until these problems are overcome, skill-based 
differences can only rise.
These structural inequalities are embedded within, 
and support, a political equilibrium based on the creation 
and sharing of economic rents. Some of the rents shifted 
with economic liberalization, at least for the corporate 
sector—from access to land, major contracts or alloca-
tions of spectrum. And state-mediated subsidies and 
rents to social groups remain pervasive.
Long-term implications of disparities 
and remedial actions
The inequalities have indeed been consistent with both 
the economic restructuring and the maintenance of 
political stability of the past 25 years. But in the longer 
term this system is likely to take India down a path of 
entrenched inequalities, excessive power to the few, 
distributional fights over patronage and rising collec-
tive and criminal violence. Think of this as the Latin 
Americanisation of India—a sure path to the middle 
income trap.
Experience in other countries suggests an alterna-
tive transformational scenario. It involves developing the 
political, social and economic institutions that assure 
genuine equity and provide incentives for innovation, 
investment in physical and human capital, and economic 
restructuring. Key areas for action include the following:
Laying the institutional bases for competitive  •	
and effectively regulated markets is an essential 
ingredient. This would include implementing the 
2002 competition law, genuinely independent 
regulatory and judicial processes and transpar-
ent mechanisms in domains of state control, 
such as land and public-private partnerships, 
complemented by societal watchdogs. This is 
in the interest of the business community as 
“
India’s current five-year plan rightly focuses 
on achieving faster and more inclusive growth
Groups 1983 1993–94 2004–05
Hindu: Scheduled tribe 70 75 67
Hindu: Scheduled caste 79 78 78
Hindu: Others 109 110 111
Hindu (all) 99 100 97
Muslim 90 89 89
Christian: Scheduled tribe 92 95 103
Christian: Others 128 131 158
Other religion 139 128 132
All 100 100 100
Source: National Sample Survey, various rounds.
Household expenditure per capita of groups as a share of the national average (percent)
Table   
2





















































































4 a collective, even if individual businesses gain 
from individual influence in the system.
The issues for group-based differences revolve  •	
around reducing conflict and the politicization 
of difference. A requisite for genuine change is 
reducing the incentives for the political class to 
use group-based identity to obtain political sup-
port. The very weakness of the state is a source 
of the problem here, since politicians cannot 
credibly commit to deliver on promises requiring 
effective state action. Also fundamental is deep-
ening the pursuit of universalistic approaches 
to citizen rights, exemplified by the design 
principles of the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme.
Spatial differences are also tough to resolve,  •	
as illustrated by the persistence of lagging 
regions in other countries—from southern Italy 
to northeast Brazil. Regional policies have a 
poor record. Institutional change within lagging 
states, supported by deeper decentralization to 
the third level of government, is likely to be the 
most promising route.
A genuinely meritocratic education system is  •	
fundamental at both basic and tertiary levels. 
While the expansion of the private sector has 
a role here, real equity will also have to involve 
major changes within the state system, espe-
cially for basic education.
Achieving inclusive growth
India’s current five-year plan rightly focuses on achiev-
ing faster and more inclusive growth—a focus both 
necessary and timely. The plan lays out in detail the 
programmes and policies to achieve this ambitious 
objective. Given this focus, we mention only a few (obvi-
ous) points:
The key to inclusive growth and social cohe- •	
sion is creating millions of jobs, both urban and 
rural. Each year for the next 30 or more years, 
as many as 16 million people will enter India’s 
labour force. This is often referred to as India’s 
“demographic dividend”—an increasing share 
of adults of working age who do not have to 
support an ageing retired population. The bulk 
of these job seekers will be in the slow-growing 
populous states of northeast India, coming from 
rural areas seeking employment outside agri-
culture. In these areas today only 1 percent of 
the population has a formal technical education, 
and only 7 percent has received any formal or 
informal vocational training. Without a massive 
increase in education and training aimed at the 
acquisition of skills relevant to future job mar-
kets, it will be hard to make growth inclusive.
Potential job seekers will face a labour market  •	
where 94 percent of employment is in the 
low-productivity informal sector: 85 percent of 
workers are either self-employed or engaged 
in casual employment; another 9 percent are 
in informal enterprises with typically about two 
workers. only 6 percent of the workforce has 
regular employment in the organized public or 
private sectors (more than 10 workers), where 
productivity is 19–27 times higher than in the 
agricultural sector. Also needing urgent attention 
is overhauling India’s antiquated labour laws.
For growth to be inclusive, all Indians—urban  •	
and rural—must be connected to the markets 
through rural connectivity and infrastructure in 
the near term.
Another major challenge is to massively scale  •	
up public services. Universal access to quality 
basic public services—including basic and 
vocational education and health services—is 
essential.
Early and determined actions along the foregoing 
lines can turn future sustained high growth into a unique 
opportunity to build a more equitable and cohesive 
society. The basic problem appears not to be the poli-
cies already on the books but their weak ineffectual 
implementation and the lack of accountability.
“
The key to inclusive growth and 
social cohesion is creating millions 
of jobs, both urban and rural





















































































4 Intergenerational issue 2. Dramatically 
improve the quality of the environment
one of the most visible improvements in the quality of life, 
as India moves from a poor society to an affluent society, 
must be in the quality of the environment. The citizens 
of an affluent India will deserve and expect to have high-
quality water and sanitation, clean air and clean streets 
along the lines of Madrid, Seoul and Singapore today.
This transformation in the quality of life will not occur 
overnight. Its seeds must be planted now and nurtured 
over the years. The process must start with a basic 
change in the mindset of public officials and citizens 
alike.
Current official position
Instead of thinking of the environment from the perspec-
tive of its citizens, the official Indian government position 
on the environment appears dominated by the geopoliti-
cal considerations. The position articulated on behalf 
of India at various international fora appears to be built 
around four propositions:
on a per capita basis, emissions from India that  •	
harm world climate—carbon dioxide and the 
rest—are much less than those from the devel-
oped countries.
India is making perceptible, indeed substantial,  •	
improvements—in the area covered by forests 
(sequestering carbon), in energy efficiency (as 
in energy-intensive industries like cement and 
steel) and in improving air quality.
Several measures and protocols being sug- •	
gested will curb India’s growth and perpetuate 
its poverty.
Developed countries, as the main doers of  •	
harm, must do their bit first before compelling 
countries like India to curb their growth.
India’s self-interest
Even though most of the foregoing arguments for 
India’s current official policy are at least partly valid, that 
policy, if sustained, will inflict grave harm on India in the 
coming 30 years. It would worsen problems that will be 
extremely difficult and expensive to remedy later. And it 
would foreclose the enormous opportunities that reme-
dial measures would hold for India if taken now.
More fundamentally, the current policy is driven 
mainly by India’s geopolitical negotiating stance rather 
than by what is good for Indian citizens and what is in 
India’s long-term self-interest. This basic mindset must 
change.
Neither the draft policy on the environment nor  •	
the pattern of development that underlies it is 
sustainable. Even under optimistic forecasts 
for nuclear and hydro power projects, coal-
fired power plants are expected to generate 
60 percent of India’s electricity in 2030. only 
one in a hundred Indians owns a car today, 
compared with 70 of every 100 in organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries. What would happen if India’s more 
than 1 billion middle income citizens in 2039 
aspire to meet their transportation needs 
through the private automobile? Then there are 
problems in mining coal. Underground fires in 
India’s coal belt—particularly in the Dhanbad-
Jharia landmass—constitute the highest inci-
dence of such fires in the world. Apart from the 
danger, the fires have severe consequences for 
the health of miners and all who live in the area.
The ecological footprint of the developed world  •	
is more than 30 times that of other countries. 
Were China and India to draw the same 
resources, it would be as if the population of the 
world had tripled. In a word, India must do its 
bit—both for itself and for the world. Even though 
the amounts of emissions and pollutants that it 
releases per capita are low, the totals in absolute 
terms are large. If India were to persist in acquir-
ing the consumption levels and production 
processes of the developed world, the absolute 
volume of emissions would become fatally large 
because of the size of India’s population.
“
One of the most visible improvements 
in the quality of life, as India moves from 
a poor society to an affluent society, must 
be in the quality of the environment





















































































4 Steps to preserve and restore the environment  •	
present an economic opportunity for India. 
The trillion dollar market in carbon trade under 
the Clean Development Mechanism affords an 
immediate opportunity. Each solution that India 
develops for its own problems will be something 
that it can market to other countries facing the 
same problems: alternative fuels; microbes that 
break up pollutants; processes and equipment 
to desalinate seawater using solar and wind 
energy; an efficient and hygienic composting 
toilet; organic and biofertilizers, insecticides and 
pesticides; and technologies to recycle waste 
and water.
India aspires to global leadership. •	  Its aim is to 
be an exemplar and global power in 30 years. 
But it will not be able to urge others to take 
steps that it is failing to take itself.
Successes in improving efficiency of resource  •	
use and reducing emissions have been reg-
istered everywhere—in India as much as in 
Europe. They have not curtailed growth. To the 
contrary, they have saved countries from having 
to expend resources to deal with the conse-
quences of “growth”.
Within India are many successful examples that 
should be emulated more broadly: the swiftness with 
which land has regenerated itself once elementary steps 
have been taken to cordon it, the substantial increases 
in the incomes and assets of the community once local 
water bodies have been restored, the construction of 
buildings—such as the large office and research com-
plexes at the Indian Institute of Technology in Kanpur—
that consume 40 percent less power than conventional 
buildings and the considerable amelioration in pollutants 
discharged even for traditionally notorious polluters, 
like the leather and paper and pulp industries. Similarly, 
individual firms have shown how they can simultane-
ously benefit society and improve their bottom lines. For 
almost five years, ITC has been storing and sequestering 
twice the amount of carbon dioxide that it emits. over 
the last seven years, it has created rainwater-harvesting 
capacity that is three times the water it consumes. And 
it now recycles all its waste. Such solutions must be 
widely published and massively scaled up.
Things to be done
For all these reasons, and for sheer survival, India must 
preserve and improve its environment—from the kitchen 
in the hut to the once-mighty rivers:
First is much more rigorous and credible  •	
enforcement of the environmental laws and 
standards already on the books. For the 
environment, as for so many other subjects, 
India has a plethora of laws and regulations. 
The basic problem is that they are not being 
enforced. Instead, many of them have been 
converted into “octroi posts”, obstacles placed 
in the way, only to be lifted after pockets have 
been filled.
The second set of actions that need to be taken  •	
is on the fiscal side. Ecologists estimate that 
the world spends $700 billion a year to damage 
the environment—in harmful subsidies. India 
contributes its share—in terms of subsidies to 
coal, power, chemical fertilizers and the like. 
Already imposing a fiscal burden, they cannot 
be sustained for long. But that is the minor 
consideration: the greater injury is that they 
conceal consumption and production patterns 
harmful to the health of the people even as 
they make India more dependent on resources 
that will soon be exhausted. These subsidies 
should thus be weeded out. on the other side, 
India has the opportunity to pioneer green 
taxation—to tax commodities and processes 
by their ecological footprint and the quantum 
of nonrenewable resources used; it will do well 
not to defer action until it alights on the ideal 
rates for taxation of different commodities and 
processes. Levels that should be mandated 
will make the commodities and processes 
“
Within India are many successful 
examples of environmental policy that 
should be emulated more broadly





















































































4 expensive enough to make consumers and 
producers switch to alternatives.
In many spheres, technologies that can  •	
produce major savings are already at hand. 
The Integrated Energy Policy prepared by the 
Planning Commission estimates that India can 
save up to 15 percent of its electricity consump-
tion just by better demand management. In 
the same way, major savings in energy con-
sumption can be affected by more thoughtful 
building design. Similarly, the least expensive 
way for fixing carbon is forestation. These better 
practices should be pursued—through pricing, 
enforcement, incentives, building codes and the 
curricula in schools of architecture.
But in many areas new technologies have to  •	
be developed. With its large technological 
workforce, India can develop these technolo-
gies by setting up national research missions to 
develop, for example, more efficient photovoltaic 
cell technology, an efficient hydrogen fuel cell, 
clean coal processes, desalination of seawater 
using solar and wind energies available in 
virtually endless supply along India’s long 
coastline, fast breeder nuclear reactors and the 
thorium cycle for nuclear power. Government 
and industry must work together to harness 
India’s technological and engineering talent 
for breakthroughs in such products and proc-
esses. The pioneering work of Japan’s Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry in bringing 
together industrial firms, government laborato-
ries and technological personnel is an example 
for India to emulate.
India’s stance on climate negotiations
India’s per capita income in 2039 would be about the 
same as the average global income today, with dramatic 
implications for India’s negotiating stance. Indian policy-
makers need to recognize that targets based on per 
capita emissions and targets based on GDP per capita 
will not be very different for India in 25–30 years, when 
the measures start to become binding.
India will enjoy at least a 15-year grace period 
before being asked to take significant measures. So it 
may be better to negotiate a slightly longer lead time, 
say 20 years, and then give in to the use of targets 
based on GDP per capita because India will by then 
be at world average incomes anyway! In return for its 
enthusiastic efforts to fight and reverse climate change, 
India should ask for significant financial assistance and 
for free access to the latest technologies from the global 
community.
Such a strategy will be good for Indian citizens and 
the global community alike, demonstrating India’s desire 
to be a good global citizen.
Intergenerational issue 3. Eliminate 
infrastructure bottlenecks—
Create a competitive edge
There is a widespread consensus in the country—
among the political parties encompassing all phi-
losophies, the business community, the public policy 
experts, the civic society, and the public at large—that 
adequate infrastructure is crucial to economic growth 
and development. Since 1991 many far reaching reforms 
have been announced, related laws passed by the 
Parliament, and institutional changes implemented. 
So, progress has been visible in some areas, notably 
telecommunications and civil aviation.
Massive investment requirements 
and public-private partnerships
India’s total investment in infrastructure in 2002 was 
estimated at $31 billion, or 6 percent of GDP. This pales 
in comparison with China, which reportedly invested 
$260 billion, or 20 percent of GDP in infrastructure that 
year. China is continuing to improve its infrastructure at a 
rate much faster than that of India. So, instead of catch-
ing up with China, India’s investment rate dropped from 6 
percent of GDP in 2002 to about 4.5–5 percent in 2006, 
before inching up to 5–6 percent during 20007/08.
“
India has the opportunity to pioneer 
green taxation—to tax commodities and 
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4 Between 2009 and 2020 India should invest on 
average between 9–10 percent of GDP in infrastructure 
development to meet the needs of a fast growing 
economy. The 11th Plan anticipates average investment 
to GDP ratio of 7–8 percent between 2008 and 2012. 
our estimates suggest that this level of investment may 
not be adequate if the economy resumes its fast growth 
soon.
These massive requirements cannot be met without 
much greater involvement of the private sector—for two 
main reasons. First, the government budget does not 
have the capacity to finance on its own anywhere close 
to the investments required, or even the levels assumed 
in the plan. Second, the lack of management and techni-
cal skills in the public sector is an equally important, and 
perhaps binding, constraint. The capacity of the many 
public bodies responsible for infrastructure (ministries, 
regulatory agencies, state-owned enterprises) is not 
adequate for transforming the efficiency and quality of 
services.
India’s 11th Plan has assumed that the share of 
private financing would rise to about 30 percent of total 
investment during the plan period. This level of private 
investment would translate into almost $400 billion 
during the next 10 years (based on our estimates of 
India’s needs). A massive increase over current levels, 
this can be achieved only through much more extensive 
public-private partnerships in all facets of infrastructure 
development. Achieving these ambitious expectations 
would make the country a leader among developing 
countries in tapping private resources to build and oper-
ate infrastructure.
Is the main problem the policy 
framework—or policy implementation?
An important development in the last five years is the 
major effort by the government to replace, or revise, 
some of the existing policies and rules relating to private-
public partnership in infrastructure. These revisions were 
designed to correct anomalies identified as a result of 
the actual experience. Major efforts have been made to 
put in place new policies for public-private partnership 
based on international best practice for airports, ports, 
and highways.
India now has, with a few exceptions, a robust 
policy framework for improving infrastructure services 
and facilitating much greater private participation. The 
framework is most robust for telecommunications and 
for civil aviation. The new policies for private-public 
partnership in national highways and for privatizing four 
major airports are also sound and need no major revi-
sions. The country also has a progressive policy in the 
2003 Electricity Act.
overall, India’s very progressive policy framework 
can put it at the forefront of enhancing the access to 
and the quality of infrastructure services and attracting 
significant private participation.
But implementation of the new policies leaves much 
to be desired in most sectors. Almost all implementation 
problems are rooted in two main causes. First are the 
implementation capacity constraints within the public 
sector to plan, build and operate the massive new gen-
erating, transmission and distribution capacity in a timely 
and efficient manner. And second, even more critical, 
one or more facets of governance prevent implementa-
tion of the agreed policies at the necessary pace.
Immediate agenda
In the near term India’s main focus should shift from 
policy formulation to policy implementation and achiev-
ing visible results on the ground. There should be a 
laser-like focus on overcoming the current infrastructure 
bottlenecks:
Implement policies already in place. •	  The govern-
ment must ensure that all ministries and govern-
ment entities implement the agreed policies and 
guidelines within a set time frame—and are held 
accountable for doing so.
Further increase •	  investments to overcome 
current bottlenecks. India needs to invest an 
average of 9–11 percent of GDP (including 
about 2.5 percent of GDP on maintenance and 
“
India should invest on average between 9–10 
percent of GDP in infrastructure development 
to meet the needs of a fast growing economy





















































































4 rehabilitation) to support economic growth of 
9 percent a year. Thus, even if the 11th Plan 
expenditures are achieved in practice, infra-
structure bottlenecks would most likely worsen 
when the economy resumes rapid growth. So, 
budget allocations should be increased for sec-
tors and states that implement agreed policies 
and demonstrate the capacity to use additional 
funds effectively.
Strengthen institutional capacity •	 . Many govern-
ment agencies responsible for planning, review-
ing, awarding and overseeing private-public 
projects have to acquire the requisite skills and 
managerial systems as soon as possible.
Simplify and delegate government decision- •	
making. The present implementation constraints 
arise partly from the cumbersome processes 
and risk-averse decisionmaking culture at all lev-
els of government. To remedy this the govern-
ment leaders at the highest level must delegate 
authority to the most competent bodies at lower 
levels as well as support a major simplification 
of decisionmaking processes.
Adapt crash programmes to eliminate power  •	
shortages and accelerate completion of rural 
electrification and national highways. Continuing 
with business as usual, or tinkering at the 
margins, will not improve the situation in three 
critical areas: power generation and distribution, 
rural electrification and national highways. The 
only solution is to adopt a crash programme 
in each of these areas with the full support 
and commitment from the highest levels of 
government.
Monitor results and enforce accountability.  •	
Government leaders should hold lower-level 
decisionmakers accountable for results on the 
ground. The key to resolving the current worri-
some situation and preventing further deteriora-
tion will be the willingness and ability of the top 
political leadership to move the “system” with 
much greater urgency and a results orientation. 
Delegating authority, enforcing accountability and 
monitoring progress under the three crash pro-
grammes suggested here could be initial actions 
for the new unit in the Prime Minister’s office.
Longer term policy agenda
The basic goals of the longer term agenda should be for 
India to develop world-class infrastructure—in coverage, 
quality and efficiency—that meets the needs of an affluent 
society and of businesses operating in a very large and 
globally competitive economy. By 2039 India would need 
infrastructure that at least matches South Korea’s today.
The longer term effort should be driven by the fol-
lowing reforms:
Decentralize authority and accountability to  •	
states and cities. India, one of the two most 
populous countries in the world, is rapidly 
becoming one of the largest and most complex 
economies. Some individual states are bigger 
than most countries. Uttar Pradesh, for example, 
is more populous than Brazil. It is impossible 
for an economy of such size and complexity to 
meet its infrastructure needs through a process 
dominated by the central government. India 
must align the future roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities in infrastructure in line with our 
earlier proposal for a major decentralization of 
power to the state and local governments. For 
example, the primary responsibility for providing 
and financing municipal services such as urban 
transport, water, sanitation and electricity should 
be delegated to the municipal governments.
Make government smaller and smarter. •	  With 
time, the primary role of not only the central 
government but increasingly the state govern-
ments should be long-term planning, policy 
formulation and market oversight. Some state-
owned enterprises that continue to provide 
services should be made fully autonomous and 
subject to the financial discipline of the markets 
“
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4 and the supervision of the relevant regulatory 
authority. This will also facilitate trimming and 
streamlining the ministerial structure.
Increase the role of the private sector •	 . Using 
Japan, South Korea and the United States as 
models, most public services can and should 
be provided by private suppliers by 2039. In 
some sectors (such as telecommunications) 
this may be achieved quickly, while in others 
(such as railways) the transition period would 
be longer. A longer term vision should be 
developed soon to allow all parties to adjust and 
prepare for the changes.
Make markets more competitive—with stronger  •	
and more independent regulatory bodies. This 
is clearly a major prerequisite for giving the 
private sector a much greater role. The single 
most important agenda item in this context is 
the need to make regulatory bodies stronger, 
more independent and more credible, as is 
already the case with the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority. The need is urgent 
in power, civil aviation, railways and ports. 
over time, water and sanitation must also be 
covered.
Focus on the longer term •	 . Infrastructure is a 
prime example of an area that needs a long-
term and multigenerational perspective. It is 
imperative that governments at all three levels—
centre, state and local—periodically formulate a 
long-term vision of infrastructure needs (quality 
as well as quantity) under their purview and 
make it publicly available so that both consum-
ers and producers can take day-to-day deci-
sions within this framework.
Intergenerational issue 4. Improve the 
delivery of public services—Create 
functioning cities for sustaining growth
For citizens, perhaps the biggest difference between a 
poor (developing) society and an affluent (developed) 
society is the quality of life—especially the access, qual-
ity and reliability of public services. In this context, most 
cities in India have the look and feel of a poor country. 
The quality of public services available throughout the 
country is abysmal. This must change between now and 
2039.
A transformation to an urban society—
half a billion more urban dwellers?
Within a generation India will be transformed from a 
largely rural to an urban economy. According to UN 
projections, about half the total population of nearly 
1.6 billion will be living in cities by 2039; others believe 
the share could be as high as 60 percent. The absolute 
numbers are even more staggering. There will be at least 
400–500 million more urban dwellers by 2039.
Almost all cities can be expected to grow. The 
current big cities will become still bigger, and many 
medium-size towns will become large cities (figure 7). 
This shift in population to cities is an inevitable conse-
quence of economic growth driven largely by industry 
“
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As in China, urban population 
is on the rise in India
Figure   
7
Source: National Sample Survey.





















































































4 and services, sectors that attract job seekers from rural 
areas and need urban agglomerations for their labour 
and skills.
The efficient functioning of cities will influence labour 
costs and thus have a direct bearing on competitiveness 
and growth. In a global world Indian businesses will 
need to compete globally for highly skilled Indian profes-
sionals, who will increasingly consider the quality of life 
as a factor in their own location decisions.
But most Indian cities are dysfunctional, suffering 
from serious deficiencies in the quality and quantity 
of infrastructure. Most suffer from poor roads, uncol-
lected garbage, regular flooding, stagnant storm and 
waste water and unreliable supplies of drinking water. 
Major investments are needed not only to overcome 
the backlog of services but also to keep pace with 
population growth. operations and maintenance are 
entirely inadequate. The ranks of those in slum and 
squatter settlements continue to grow. In short, the 
quality of life in Indian cities compares unfavourably 
with that in other lower middle income countries, and 
is far from the level India should aspire to as an affluent 
country.
Most Indian city administrators point to a lack of 
resources as the underlying cause of poor quality of 
infrastructure services. on average, an Indian city 
spends less than $50 per capita on infrastructure and 
services. Estimates for what would be an adequate 
level vary widely, but it is generally recognized that the 
expenditure needs to increase several-fold.
Inadequate resources are only a part of the story. 
Most Indian cities suffer from poor management. 
There is a lack of proper systems and processes. The 
quality of staff is poor. Corruption is believed to be 
widespread. These considerations have ostensibly led 
most states to keep a tight grip on city administrations, 
controlling most functions to the point that cities func-
tion essentially as departments of the state govern-
ment. The tight grip leaves little room for local initiatives 
to improve the provision of services and the quality of 
life in cities.
Fundamental reform: full autonomy for major cities
There is little likelihood that the present system of urban 
governance will significantly improve in the function-
ing of cities. only self-governing cities functioning as 
autonomous corporate entities can alter the current 
situation.
That was the spirit of the 74th Amendment of 
the Constitution, approved in 1993. Unfortunately, 
implementation has been poor except in two or three 
states. Vested political interests at the state level, often 
in conflict with local interests, have prevented progress. 
The government of India needs to give a major push to 
ensure that all states implement the 74th Amendment, 
both in letter and spirit. Greater autonomy for cities 
should be accompanied by a strong push to improve 
their capacity and governance.
of course, autonomy needs to be accompanied 
by clear accountability and related measures to ensure 
better governance. But these measures cannot be in the 
form of state governments keeping oversight over each 
and every aspect of city functions. Cities should function 
as true corporate entities responsible for financing and 
managing services in their jurisdiction.
A start can be made with the 100 largest municipal 
corporations. These would cover all cities with popula-
tions over 500,000, today accounting for some 160 mil-
lion people. Most of these cities, if not all, will have 
million-plus populations by 2039.
The autonomy for cities should be defined under 
state law to encompass:
Functional autonomy for all activities normally  •	
carried out within the city jurisdiction—including 
town planning, land use regulation, infrastruc-
ture and service provision, basic education and 
public health. The states should have no direct 
role.
Financial autonomy to mobilize taxes and user  •	
fees consistent with the needs of the city—
and to plan and implement budgets. The law 
could specify types of taxes that the cities are 
empowered to levy but not the levels. Property 
“
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as autonomous corporate entities 
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4 taxes, a grossly underused source in most 
Indian cities, should become the most signifi-
cant source of revenues. The state governments 
have limited and well defined powers—for exam-
ple, to prohibit taxes, such as octroi, that hinder 
free movement of goods within the state.
Administrative autonomy to permit cities  •	
to have their own system of staff selection. 
Professionalism in various aspects of city man-
agement should be promoted through competi-
tive appointments, particularly for managerial 
positions. A city manager, accountable to the 
city council, should be the CEo of the city, as 
in many developed countries. Heads of other 
departments should report to the CEo. The 
state should have no role in any staff and mana-
gerial appointments.
All procurement by relevant departments in  •	
the municipal corporation within a prescribed 
procurement law. That law would set out proce-
dures for efficient and transparent procurement, 
without reference to the state government.
Land use planning entirely within the control of  •	
the city. There is also a need to overhaul the 
land use planning process, which lacks any 
economic rationale and is subject to frequent 
litigation and court intervention. A modern con-
cept of land use envisages the plan to be a liv-
ing document that must be revised and updated 
with changing conditions. An open and trans-
parent process encouraging debate among 
competing interests is much more appropriate 
than adherence to a rigidly prescribed plan.
Introduce modern concepts of management
Elsewhere we discuss the need for a smarter, leaner, 
stronger and more focused government. This is also 
true for cities. Indeed, city governments have the long-
est distance to travel in delivering services that affect 
people’s lives most directly. That would require the 
following:
A sharp focus on essential functions— •	 without 
being burdened with peripheral activities that 
are wasteful.
A commercial orientation in service delivery.  •	
Water and sewage are invariably mismanaged 
by unwieldy municipal bureaucracies without 
any financial discipline. They must be run 
by corporate bodies responsible to the city 
government and operating under a transpar-
ent regulatory structure for tariffs and service 
expectations.
Contracting out under clear service expecta- •	
tions, as the norm, in as many activities as 
possible—including road maintenance, solid 
waste collection and disposal, and billing and 
collecting taxes and fees.
Qualified staff, selected transparently and  •	
competitively at all levels, but most specifically 
for managerial positions. City managers in the 
developed countries are in great demand and 
often move from smaller to larger cities based 
on their highly valued managerial experience.
Ensure good governance
Autonomy for cities needs to be accompanied by 
measures that ensure good governance. Without such 
measures, the effectiveness of decentralization will 
be severely limited, adding to public skepticism about 
government. Indeed, consistent with the experience of 
most developed countries, local government, as the 
government closest to citizens, should enjoy the highest 
level of confidence.
The suggested measures include:
A municipal law that sets out the functions and  •	
responsibilities of the city government, the way 
in which it should perform the functions and its 
accountability to the citizens. Full transparency 
and disclosure should be enshrined in the law.
Stronger accountability for results •	 —of the city 
managers to elected officials, and of the elected 
officials to citizens.
“
City governments have the longest 
distance to travel in delivering services 
that affect people’s lives directly





















































































4 Elected municipal councils as the most  •	
important part of accountability to citizens. 
Party-based elections and the large number of 
councillors needed for adequate representation 
make it difficult to assign clear accountability. 
Implementation of the recommendation of the 
Second Administrative Reform Commission for 
a directly elected mayor, with requisite powers, 
is necessary to pinpoint accountability more 
sharply. The council should have no executive 
implementation authority. Its functions should 
be defined under the law as setting policies and 
priorities and conducting oversight.
Senior managers of the city, including the city  •	
manager, proposed by the mayor based on a 
transparent selection process and approved 
by the council. The mayor should also have 
the power to remove managers for cause, with 
approval by a majority of the council.
Appointment of an inspector-general with the  •	
power to investigate citizen complaints. The 
inspector-general need not have any enforce-
ment power. Any reports should be in the public 
domain and provide a basis for elected officials 
to initiate action against city officials and for the 
electorate to judge the performance of individual 
councillors.
Public information and disclosure of all aspects  •	
of the functioning of the municipal government—
  particularly in the areas of budget, expenditures, 
procurement, personnel, land use planning and 
modifications, building permits, property valua-
tion and taxes, and all deliberations of the coun-
cil. The Right to Information Act already requires 
the appointment of public information officers to 
respond to citizen requests for information. But 
the cities should be required to do more proac-
tive disclosure.
Monitoring of the performance of the city  •	
government by citizen organizations that act 
as watchdogs against malfeasance. These 
organizations can pursue the requirement for 
disclosure, using the Right to Information Act, 
if needed. They can also issue citizen report 
cards on the effectiveness of various govern-
ment functions. And they can act as advocates 
for the citizens, particularly the poor and disad-
vantaged. Such organizations are emerging in 
many cities, particularly in the large metropolitan 
cities. Indian business houses should support 
their efforts.
Central government incentives for 
granting autonomy to cities
The central government can provide incentives to states 
to grant full autonomy to cities. Its role must be one 
of persuasion, either moral or party-based or through 
incentives.
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission provides a useful model to build on. It should 
be increased and made available to the 100 largest 
municipal corporations if the states pass laws that grant 
full autonomy to cities, in letter and spirit, and implement 
measures for good governance.
These measures should be required as prior 
actions and not be promises of action before funding is 
released. The funding should be tied to the augmenta-
tion of self-generated revenues and be committed for 
a long period (say, 10 years) for budget support, not 
specific projects.
Intergenerational issue 5. Renew the focus 
on education, technological development 
and innovation—Keys to sustaining 
improvements in competitiveness
The recent growth in India’s economy has come mainly 
from productivity gains as workers move from farms to 
services. But to sustain long-term growth and become 
an affluent nation without falling into the middle income 
trap, India will need continual improvements in competi-
tiveness and productivity. It will have to replicate its suc-
cess from information technology to other sectors, laying 
“
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4 the foundation for perpetual gains from a workforce that 
consistently creates, acquires and uses knowledge, 
and making full use of existing technologies to raise 
productivity to the best possible domestic and global 
benchmarks.
In the coming decades India’s demographics will 
describe either its most significant comparative advan-
tage or its most disappointing failure of political will. In 
the new global economy a nation’s wealth lies not in 
its land or capital but in its skilled people, who gener-
ate new knowledge and convert it into useful ideas, 
goods and services. With plenty of smart, young and 
competent workers the challenge for India is to deploy 
its resources to produce the highest possible return. 
For this, India needs a massive increase in the capacity 
and quality of higher education and in the amount and 
scope of investments in technology and innovation. 
Business as usual will not work. Instead, a radical 
change is needed in the political commitment, mindset 
and approach—including a redefinition of the roles of the 
government and the private sector.
Higher education
Despite many islands of excellence—including the insti-
tutes of technology, management and science—India’s 
education system is dysfunctional, with low capacity, 
poor governance and overregulation, with low quality 
and grossly inadequate outputs, with funding and skill 
deficits and with faculty shortages.
At 11.8 percent, India’s tertiary gross enrolment ratio 
is dismally low, especially when compared with China 
(22 percent), the United States (84 percent) and South 
Korea (96 percent). A recent McKinsey study estimates 
that only 10 percent of Indian arts and humanities gradu-
ates and only 25 percent of engineering graduates are 
globally competitive—symptoms of a quality deficit in 
both public and private institutions. These conditions 
have already resulted in shortages of skilled workers 
in industry and academia, creating faculty shortages, 
  throttling advances in science and technology and con-
straining competitiveness.
India’s rapidly growing and modernizing economy 
requires a massive expansion and dramatic improve-
ment in the quality of higher education. The tasks: 
increase investments from 4 percent of GDP to 8 
percent, increase tertiary enrolments by 8 times, create 
1,200 new universities (100 of them world class), create 
20,000 degree-granting and 100,000 community col-
leges and expand all existing institutions, improving their 
quality.
These ambitious goals are conceivable if grounded 
in universal access to quality basic education. The 11th 
Plan rightly puts major emphasis on improving primary 
education in the country. It also describes many laud-
able plans. But primary education today still suffers 
from numerous long-standing problems. Economic, 
social and political imperatives demand that the new 
government give the highest possible priority to fixing 
the system.
Technology and innovation
With a comprehensive network of research institutions, 
India has the world’s third largest scientific establishment. 
It has done well in strategic research on space, defence, 
atomic energy and supercomputers. It is also becoming 
a top global player in biotechnology, pharmaceuti-
cals, information technology and automotive parts and 
assembly. The recent crowning glory of India’s space 
research—the first moon orbiter project, Chandrayan-
1—has placed India among a handful of nations that have 
a credible capability in space science and technology.
But India’s expenditures on research and develop-
ment, at 0.9 percent of GDP (70–80 percent public), 
are lower than the 1.4 percent in China, 2 percent in 
Europe and 2.6 percent in the United States—and only 
0.25 percent of GDP is focused on civilian applications. 
Moreover, the research and development system is nar-
row in scope, has low outputs and is disconnected from 
the market.
India needs a technology and innovation system that 
is highly productive, globally competitive and capable of 
meeting the needs of its globalizing economy and lifting 
“
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4 the productivity of its informal sector. This requires an 
increase in research and development investments from 
0.8 percent of GDP to 3 percent—driven largely by the 
private sector—pursuing frontier, strategic and inclusive 
innovation, enhancing commercializable research and 
development and creating a foundation to diffuse and 
encourage the absorption of new technologies.
The reform agenda
Translating this ambitious agenda into concrete actions 
will require a major shift in the roles of government and 
the private sector, including foreign direct investment. 
The government should be a facilitator with smart regu-
lation, light oversight, greater financing, enhanced private 
participation with proper policies, taxes and other incen-
tives, leveraging international knowledge and financial 
resources. It should focus on public goods where social 
returns are highest.
For higher education
Increase the supply of quality faculty and the  •	
output of scientists, engineers and other mas-
ters and doctoral graduates.
Set up an independent regulatory authority for  •	
higher education, drawing lessons from such 
agencies such as the Telecom Regulatory 
Authority and the Securities and Exchange 
Board, with authority to reward good perform-
ance and impose sanctions for poor perform-
ance and noncompliance.
Grant academic and research institutions, fiscal  •	
and managerial autonomy, with high-quality 
leadership.
Promote private participation in higher educa- •	
tion and vocational training with tax incentives 
and an umbrella not-for-profit education com-
pany law.
Establish generous and comprehensive student  •	
loan programmes while enabling institutions to 
charge suitable tuition fees, compete for faculty 
and students, create modern infrastructure and 
invest in global programmes.
Invite foreign direct investment in higher educa- •	
tion and welcome reputable foreign universities 
to open campuses in India and allow Indian 
institutions to open campuses abroad.
Export skilled labour and Indian higher  •	
education—to become a global skills capital of 
the world.
For technology development and innovation
Develop an innovation ecosystem comprising an  •	
integrated science, technology and innovation 
policy, facilitative intellectual property regime, 
responsive infrastructure early-stage and ven-
ture capital, and science and technology parks 
and incubation centres with clusters of higher 
education and research and development 
institutions.
Provide support for basic and applied research  •	
and technology diffusion through tax credits, 
matching grants, loan guarantees, technology 
rewards and training support.
Pursue inclusive innovation to convert grass- •	
roots innovations into viable products and to 
create affordable products for the masses—
and increase research and development in 
agriculture.
Review the vast chains of public institutions— •	
such as the Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research and Indian Council of Medical 
Research—and pursue appropriate actions 
to right-size them, including exit, privatization 
and transfer to universities and conversions to 
research universities. Those remaining should 
be operated as commercial corporations with 
increased cross-institutional synergies, trans-
parent management and accountability, and a 
sharp focus on commercializing research and 
development and meeting market needs.
Improve incentives to harness domestic and  •	
global knowledge, including appropriate 
changes in foreign direct investment, in trade 
“
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other incentives, leveraging international 
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4 and technology licensing, in royalty payment 
regulations and in foreign collaboration and 
technology diplomacy.
Establish as a public-private partnership a  •	
National Research and Education Network—
with high-speed nationwide dedicated links to 
expand educational opportunities (faster and 
cheaper), tap global knowledge and improve 
access to information for citizens.
Create centres of excellence focusing on  •	
public goods such as research on advanced 
energy technologies, access to clean water, 
urban transport and ayurvedic and traditional 
medicine.
Intergenerational issue 6. Launch a revolution 
in energy—Ensure security and competitiveness
India’s aspirations to become an affluent society within 
one generation must be pursued in a global context of 
scarce, unreliable and expensive energy supplies, with 
rising pressures to reduce carbon emissions to preserve 
the global climate.
In addition to its large and highly skilled labour force, 
its ability to foster innovation, the entrepreneurial spirit 
of its people and the business acumen of its corporate 
sector, India’s long-term competitiveness will depend 
on its ability to use natural resources efficiently. In this 
context, the efficiency of energy use and the fuel mix will 
be most important. Reducing India’s appetite for energy 
supplies from international markets would also dampen 
upward pressures on energy prices. It is thus in India’s 
interest to base its growth path on an energy and carbon 
scenario that emphasizes efficiency, minimizes the use 
of fossil fuels and is thus sustainable for India and for the 
world (table 3).
on its current trajectory, India’s call on the world’s 
energy resources in 2039 would increase to about 3,100 
million tons of oil equivalent, and its contribution to car-
bon emissions, to 6.5 gigatons—unsustainable for India 
and unacceptable for the world.
A sustainable scenario will require India to decouple 
its energy consumption from its economic growth and 
to decouple carbon emissions from energy consump-
tion. To these ends, India has to achieve unprecedented 
“
The benefits of India’s carbon savings to 
the global environment are enough to support 
a deal with the international community 
to enable India to afford and acquire the 
most advanced energy technologies
Business as usual scenario Sustainable scenario
2005 2030 2039 2005 2030 2039
Total energy (millions of tons of oil equivalent) 537  1,793  3,100  537  1,431  1,900 
Energy mix (%)
Coal 39 48 49 0.9 40 40
Oil 24 27 28 24 23 20
Gas 5 7 7 5 9 8
Hydro 2 1.8 1.5 2 3 3
Nuclear 1 3 3.5 1 5 8
Renewable 0 1.2 1.5 0 3 8
Biomass 29 12 9.5 29 17 13
Carbon emissions (gigatons) 1.1 3.9 6.5 1.1 3.2 3.6
Carbon capture and storage (gigatons) 0 0 0 0 0 0.4
Net emissions (gigatons) 1.1 3.9 6.5 1.1 3.2 3.2
Energy and the future: India’s business as usual and sustainable scenarios
Table   
3





















































































4 energy efficiency and energy diversification: maximizing 
the use of clean energy resources, minimizing inefficien-
cies in the energy supply-demand chain and reducing its 
dependence on imported oil and deploying technologies 
to curtail the growth in carbon dioxide emissions. Such 
an energy revolution would bring energy consumption 
in 2039 to about 1,900 million tons of oil equivalent and 
carbon emissions to 3.6 gigatons, a footprint in line with 
India’s share of the global economy.
The benefits of India’s carbon savings to the global 
environment are enough to support a deal with the inter-
national community to enable India to afford and acquire 
the most advanced energy technologies as they become 
available.
Launching an energy revolution for 
energy security and competitiveness
India will not be alone. The world will collectively go 
through an energy revolution or carbon revolution in the 
next three decades—a revolution that will create for India 
as much opportunity as challenge.
The international community recognizes that the 
global carbon emissions target cannot be achieved 
without India’s cooperation. India could thus count on 
an effective partnership and a global compact with the 
global community, which would bring with it substantial 
technological and financial support in return for pursuing 
an energy strategy in India’s self-interest.
India’s gains from joining this global partnership will 
be to reduce the vulnerability of its economy to costly 
and unreliable energy imports and improve the com-
petitiveness of its economy. And it will place India at the 
forefront of some very advanced technologies, critical 
in India’s objective to specialize and become a global 
leader in a few advanced technologies.
A framework for India’s energy revolution is based 
on assumptions for progress in energy efficiency and 
significant use of renewable and nuclear technologies, 
consistent with the emerging policies of the govern-
ment. In June 2008 India’s Prime Minister announced 
a climate change plan with a vision of making India’s 
economic development energy efficient, having solar 
power occupy the centre stage and pooling all of India’s 
scientific, technical and managerial talents with financial 
resources to develop solar energy. But the plan makes 
no explicit commitment to reducing carbon emissions. 
our basic proposals are in line with the energy policy 
adopted by the Union Cabinet in December 2008, but 
with differences in degree and emphasis.
A laser-like focus on translating 
policy into concrete actions
Perhaps the single most important recommendation is to 
give highest priority to translating government policies into 
concrete actions that demonstrate to all concerned that 
India is serious about the proposed energy revolution. This 
will require nothing less than a laser-like focus on produc-
ing results on the ground. In this context, the priorities for 
the three planks of the proposed energy strategy are:
Energy efficiency •	 . Phase out energy subsidies 
in a rapid but well designed and targeted man-
ner; set clear targets and monitoring criteria for 
improving efficiency in the power sector; set 
national standards for all major energy users in 
transport (cars, buses and trucks), buildings and 
household appliances; give generous financial 
incentives for retrofitting and using new energy-
efficient technologies; and launch a high visibility 
programme to make all government buildings 
and public enterprises models of energy effi-
ciency and green technologies.
Sustainable fuel mix •	 . Provide financial incentives 
(tax reductions and exemptions and feed-in tar-
iffs) for the development and supply of renew-
able energy and nonfossil fuels; set clear targets 
and measures of accountability for the power 
sector’s transition to a sustainable fuel mix.
Clean energy technologies •	 . Establish a crash 
programme for developing clean energy 
technologies—particularly solar, clean coal and 
carbon capture technologies under public-
private partnerships.
“
The world will collectively go through an 
energy revolution or carbon revolution in the 
next three decades—a revolution that will create 
for India as much opportunity as challenge





















































































4 Refocus the roles of government, 
private sector and civic society
A prerequisite for implementing the energy agenda is a 
total reshaping of the relative roles of government (at all 
levels), private sector and civic society. India needs to 
develop a consensus on the desirable roles of govern-
ment, the private sector and citizens in 2039, and start 
immediately to move in that direction.
Well before India becomes an affluent society and 
possibly one of the three largest economies, it will need 
a much smarter, much more focused and more effective 
government. Public sector enterprises would ultimately 
need to be privatized; in the meantime, they should be 
required to compete on equal footing with the private 
sector and be subject to the same financial discipline 
and accountability for promised results. The private sec-
tor should have the primary responsibility for implement-
ing the agreed energy policy and strategy. All energy 
enterprises should be subject either to adequate market 
competition or to oversight by strong and independent 
regulators. And civic society and the media must make 
sure that government, the private sector and regulators 
are performing their jobs well:
Government •	 . Establish a single central entity 
responsible for all energy policy. The fundamen-
tal role of the government should be to create 
the incentive system and to lead a consolidated 
energy strategy. Instead of having many sepa-
rate ministries with overlapping responsibilities 
for individual aspects of the energy sector, the 
responsibilities for setting policy, formulating 
strategy, monitoring results and establishing the 
appropriate legal and autonomous regulatory 
bodies should be given to a single entity at 
the centre. The government must establish an 
enabling business environment to attract the 
private sector to meet the huge energy invest-
ment needs efficiently. The most important 
part of this business environment is an energy 
pricing policy that provides financial incentives 
for timely investments and for the transfer and 
adoption of new technologies by the private 
sector.
Private sector •	 . Businesses should have the pri-
mary role in producing and distributing energy 
and in conducting most research and develop-
ment. In addition, they should lead efforts to 
adopt and implement energy-efficiency stand-
ards and practices, reduce carbon emissions, 
create new businesses to promote a worldwide 
energy revolution, develop clean energy tech-
nologies and eliminate energy wastage.
Regulatory bodies •	 . Establish independent and 
specialized regulators that can encourage com-
petitive market behaviour. Give regulators finan-
cial autonomy and clear authority for setting 
tariffs. Limit price regulation to the segments of 
the energy industry characterized by significant 
economies of scale (natural monopolies).
Civil society and media •	 . Encourage civic society 
and the media to play their proper role in the 
energy sector by promoting transparency and 
enforcing accountability.
Global leadership in advanced energy technologies
Worldwide, the energy industry has always depended 
very heavily on research and development. But the role 
of research and development has never been as great 
as it will be in the next three decades. India should 
aspire, as part of its energy revolution, to global leader-
ship in advanced energy technologies, establishing a 
global centre focused on such technologies as a first 
step.
The functions of the centre—demonstration, adapta-
tion and dissemination of advanced technologies—are 
the items most favoured in the support menu of climate 
change funds. Mobilizing support from such funds 
would need to take place in two phases. In the first 
phase, these funds should be approached to finance 
the establishment of the centre. In the second, the 
centre would approach climate change funds and other 
resources to mobilize large amounts of finance for 
“
The three planks of the proposed energy 
strategy are energy efficiency, sustainable 
fuel mix and clean energy technologies























































































It would be easier to visualize India as an 
affluent, buoyant economy if its neighbours in 
South Asia were also developing and stable
projects. It would serve as a channel of transferring tech-
nology and finance to the relevant energy projects.
India needs to strengthen two other major aspects 
of research and development. There should be a much 
greater degree of openness to drawing on international 
experience and advances. And the modes of research 
and development support should ensure much more 
reliance on the private sector for technology imports and 
adaptation.
Intergenerational issue 7. Foster a 
prosperous South Asia and become 
a responsible global citizen—India, 
its neighbourhood and the world
It would be easier to visualize India as an affluent, buoy-
ant economy if its neighbours in South Asia were also 
developing and stable. But instability surrounds India. 
Five of the seven countries that border India are on the 
Foreign Policy 2008 list of failed states— Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, each affected 
by conflict and violence to varying degree. It will become 
ever harder to prevent spillovers—of terrorism, refugees, 
water conflicts or regional political factionalism—without 
greater stability across the region.
None of India’s immediate neighbours, except China, 
is in the group of countries converging with organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. 
Their prospects for sustained development are poor. A 
rapidly growing India thus stands in sharp contrast to its 
neighbours.
Today, India’s per capita income is only slightly 
higher than Pakistan’s, half of Sri Lanka’s and less than 
twice that of Bangladesh. If current trends continue—
with India growing much faster than the rest of South 
Asia—the disparities in per capita income with its 
neighbours could be between 7-fold and 14-fold by 2039 
(similar to those between the United States and Central 
America and between Europe and North Africa).
Such disparities would make India a magnet for 
immigration for up to 500 million South Asians, with 
obvious fragilities. The pressures for migration and 
access to the affluent Indian neighbour would become 
enormous, almost matching those between Europe and 
North Africa or the United States and Central America. 
India could face similar debates and issues over how 
to manage illegal immigration while ensuring domestic 
security without disrupting an overall outward orientation 
in its economic policies. India would also miss out on 
the economic benefits widely acknowledged to accrue 
from direct trade links and economic integration—as 
evidenced in East Asia and Europe.
Four general factors
Four ecological, demographic and economic factors are 
certain to affect India in ways vital to its prospects:
First is the impact that the pattern of develop- •	
ment in India and its neighbours is likely to have 
on the ecology in and around India.
Second is the evolving demography of the  •	
region. Unemployment rates are already high in 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, whose popu-
lations continue to grow rapidly. Pakistan, with 
its population of 165 million already exceeding 
Russia’s, is expected to add another 100 million 
between 2000 and 2030 (table 4), according to 
the United Nations. overall, India’s five immedi-
ate neighbours would have a population of 
532 million by 2030, an increase of 167 million, 
or 46 percent. If economic growth in these 
neighbours continues to be inadequate and 
Country 2008 2020 2030
Bangladesh 150,448 185,552 203,214
Bhutan 670 820 902
Nepal 28,901 35,269 40,646
Pakistan 164,741 226,187 265,690
Sri Lanka 20,926 21,713 22,194
Total  365,686 469,541 532,646
Population growth in other South 
Asian countries (thousands)
Table   
4























































































Looking beyond its immediate 
neighbourhood, India’s fortunes will 
become more closely linked to the 
world’s economic fortunes
does not create enough jobs, ever-larger num-
bers will want to move into India.
Third, each of India’s smaller neighbours, except  •	
Bhutan, harbours apprehensions common to 
small neighbours of large states. So, India will 
have to devote enormous efforts and very sub-
stantial resources to assuage the anxieties of its 
smaller neighbours.
Fourth, continuing deterioration of governance  •	
across the region could have consequences 
for India. In several swaths of each of its 
neighbours, as in vast stretches of India, the 
writ of the state no longer applies. The resulting 
vacuum creates the space and opportunity for 
nonstate forces, and India will have to contend 
with these ominous conditions.
India, as the region’s largest country and biggest 
economy, stands to benefit most from regional stability 
and to lose most from instability. India must take the 
lead—unilaterally, if necessary—in promoting a more 
stable and prosperous South Asia.
Both Europe and the United States have used 
foreign aid and regional cooperation as instruments for 
balancing tensions with neighbours. They recognize the 
self-interest in having stable growing economies in their 
neighbourhoods. In the not-too-distant future India too 
will need to consider how it can best promote develop-
ment throughout South Asia.
only India has the size and clout to lead regional 
cooperation and promote regionwide prosperity. This 
will not be easy because differences between India 
and its neighbours have deep and sometimes violent 
roots. But the European Union and North-East Asia 
have demonstrated the potential for expanding eco-
nomic ties between erstwhile enemies. And if India is to 
become affluent, it will surely need to lead cooperative 
approaches to regional development.
For the small countries adjacent to it, India must be 
as accommodating and as generous as any country 
can be—offering assistance on a scale and on terms 
that will allay their apprehensions. India should invite 
organizations like the Asian Development Bank to devise 
and champion projects that India and its smaller neigh-
bours can undertake together.
other possible steps:
Use its advantages, its “soft power”, much more  •	
and much more creatively. India would earn tre-
mendous goodwill by expanding and improving 
its medical facilities to become the surgeon of 
choice for all neighbours—and by improving and 
expanding its facilities for higher and technical 
education as the region’s educator of choice
Start now to build think tanks and research  •	
programmes to develop a coherent strategy 
towards the rest of the region.
More fundamentally, there is a need for a very differ-
ent mindset for India to look at its neighbours. Fortress 
India, with major border restrictions and few economic 
interactions with its neighbours, is the current approach 
to minimizing negative spillovers. But that strategy will 
become counterproductive over time. It is India’s self-
interest to have a stable and prosperous neighbourhood.
India and the world
Looking beyond its immediate neighbourhood, India’s 
fortunes will become—as recent events have vividly 
demonstrated—more closely linked to the world’s eco-
nomic fortunes. over the past decade India benefited 
from faster global growth. Exports, foreign investments, 
nonresident deposits and remittances—important 
ingredients in India’s economic success—are linked to 
global growth. But India will increasingly have to bear 
the responsibilities of preserving the global economic 
commons—whether for climate change, free trade or 
stable international capital movements. It can no longer 
be a spectator in global economic management. Nor 
can it narrowly define its interests to include only short-
term economic costs and benefits.
In 2008 India’s $1.2 trillion economy represented 
2 percent of global GDP. It was the world’s 12th largest 
economy. In many respects, India has been small in 
global terms, able to take advantage of global economic 























































































India will have to demonstrate to the 
rest of the world that it is taking its global 
economic responsibilities seriously
growth but without having to worry about how its own 
actions might affect the global economy. Even rapid 
growth in foreign direct investment, nonresident depos-
its, remittances and other capital flows does not place 
India as a major player in global economic imbalances. 
In many respects, India is not central to the current 
discussions taking place on the global response to the 
financial crisis and the need to revive global growth.
That absence of global scrutiny has allowed Indian 
policymakers considerable freedom to pursue economic 
policies in their immediate national interest, without hav-
ing to worry about the impact on the rest of the world. 
That will soon change. In our scenario India could be the 
world’s third largest economy by 2020 and conceivably 
overtake the United States by 2039. India’s economy 
could also be larger than the Euro zone.
India will also become a major consumer of the 
world’s natural resources. Not only will this affect its 
approach towards economic security and its relation-
ships with other countries, but it also implies that 
the world will have an interest in ensuring that India 
becomes more efficient in its use of resources. In some 
instances, that could rebound to India’s advantage.
As discussed in the section on energy, a global 
compact with the international community—under which 
India is given free (or at least preferential) access to clean 
energy technologies and receive generous financial 
support for its own energy revolution—would enable it to 
access and afford the most advanced energy technolo-
gies as they become available. But in other areas, India 
will have to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it is 
taking its global economic responsibilities seriously.
Recent events suggest that India will be called on 
to play a leading global role in trade, finance, oil and 
climate change. In each area, what is good for India is 
not always good for the rest of the world. Until now, that 
has not become a serious issue for India’s global rela-
tions. But as India becomes a larger part of the world 
economy, such tensions will ramp up. India is already 
being invited to the world’s major stages to discuss 
these issues. But its positions are narrowly defined by its 
immediate self-interest.
It is time to think more broadly about the long-term 
implications of those approaches. From a practical per-
spective, India will need to develop a strategy for using 
its seat at the global tables—whether the G-20, the UN 
Security Council, the BRICs forum, the post-Kyoto nego-
tiations, the UN General Assembly or other bodies—and 
for playing a fair, inclusive and constructive leadership 
role in those fora.
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